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1. Purpe .. 
rhe pvpo .. ot thia tbnia ie to pre..nt Oeorc• Sant.qana • • 
doctrine ot ••--•· Bvt.d.ence ot thia doctrine waa apparent in 
Santqana • a •rlieat lerk, In'S:Ffr!tatie tf Poetq !J!4 lfl \ponl 
(1900), and continued to pel'ftd.e the three •jor atate.Dta of 
hia phUo•pby: The W• ot l!e!cm (190.S), Slceptiole an4 Az!M!1 
Fa1t.h (1923), and the !plme of B!1ng (1921-19'+0). S..ue ot 
thia e:xt.nYe J.nnueoe of the not10D ot eaacoe tbzooucbout h1a 
pbiloaopqy, .o• lbdtaticm 11\lat be blpoeecl on our Rbjeot. Since 
Santa1'au'• recent position OD .. aenoe reoelYea ita moat cle.tinitiYe 
toraulat1on 1n lk!pt1c1e and AI!Wl faith and J!e'•• of J!lnc• 
inYeatiptlona, in ep1n-1o17 aD4 ontoleD reapeot1Y8J¥, tbe 
preeent expoaition vU1 be Ualtecl to th ... two worka. 
J'l"'OI two perapeot.i Yea, one epiat.olqical. the other 
ontolopeal., eaeenoe ia .t.aoutzoatecl to be at onoe: (l) a 
prlmi'Clial tom of bainc, (2) a ft80UIU'T .mcl1t10D tor tbo~t 
to oocur and ()) t.he content of tboupt. !be relation of the• 
, / aSaultanena diMDaiona of ...... ia -.de eridAnt b,y ~tiDe 
the ontologS.oal pNpert.lea of eaaenoe •to be the oonditlona tor 
2. 
is the notion of essence as 1 t appeara 1n Santqa.na 1 a theory ot 
knowleclp and theor,y ot being. 
2. Method 
The method of this theaie is to proceed toward a cie.tinit1on 
ot essence: first, tv tollowi.ng tbe method. of Santayana • a radical 
skepticism and •econdl.¥, through an examination of essence as 
defined. 0, Santqana • a method of dialectic. Skepticie and Animal 
hi th is a statement o£ the first method 'but aclcnowlqed. by 
Santayana to be only one UIGng •IV ways to discrim1nate essence.1 
The other approacbee Santayana distinguishes in Reale S?f !!W 
as contemplation, 8piritual discipline and c:l1alectio. lone of 
these methods is wholly neaJ.eoted 1n Realma of Beg tor be reprda 
the work •not [jif an exero1se in cont.rover&,Y b\lt in meclitation. •2 
For our pm-poSN, however, dialecticJ aeema to be the 110et direct 
method or understaminc e8Mil0e. 
In the Introduction to l.ealnts ot Be1D& Santa;yana 91qe that. 
Skepticism and Animal Faith was written expreaaly to "introduce 
Realms of Be!nc"4 'tNt. that botb proceeded toward eNenti~ the 
laeorce Santqana, Realu ot I•H¥ (New York: Charles Scriooere 
Sons, 1942), p. 3. 
2Santayana, Introduction to lle!lme of Be1nc, p. xxv. 
'tn answer to tbe selt .. lmpoeed question, "What ie d1aleotic1" Sant.qana 
says, "Precisely an anal.ysia or construction ot ideal forms which 
• • • trac.. • • • the inherent pattern~~ or logical relations ot 
these toms as intuition reveals tbc." In the l83SD • • language 
dialectic is • reaaoned diacovae • about definable but non-existent 
entitles named essences. Santrqana, ftealme ot Be1M• pp. ,-4. 
4Santayana, R•lma ot Belg, p. xx.v. 
same goal which was 11to reassert those fundamental convictions or 
mankind. nl It this is so the method or skepticism pl.qa d1reotly 
into our band. For if Skeptioi!! and A.nial Fa1 th was intended 
as an introduction to the !\!alms or Be\M and advanced toward 
the same truths, then it seams evidct that Santa7ana considered 
the goal or his akept.ici.sm and. his ontoloc,y 1n some way rooted. 
1n the ame fundamental conviction•. If' Santqana 1 s P\U'JlOH is 
to recover the natural and inevitable beliefs of a huru.n being. 
and one of these beliefs is 1n the r&all ty of' essences, t.hen 
essencee must be more than logioal eonstructa to oomplete and 
give unity" to his ontoloQ'. I.olated from man•• lcn.owinl activit.T 
the c1oct71ne of' eaeenoe may stand as a formidable cont.rl't:N:U.on to 
ontoloCY, but so isolated eaNI'lcea a~r as ateril.e artifact.&. 
Some ot Santayana's entice think tbeH beliete are litt~e elae.2 
But certainly Santayana+ claim&t · eseenoe to be much more. To 
examine his claim that the reality or essence is an inevitable 
l~. 
2
sterl1ng Lamprecht notices 1n b.ia article, 8 Animal Faith and the 
Art of Intuition," Tbe Ph1lo!91i!br ot 9ftrp ~· ad. Paul 
A. SchUpp (Evanston anCrChicap: iOrthwest.nll=ttreity, 1940). 
p. 123. "The ontological 'belt.rlnca or Santayana • s doetri.De ot 
essences are not dependet~ot in any Wll1' upon bia aetbodclopoal 
skeptic1•· Tb~ are not necesaari.l3' tiecl up, even if 1n 
Santayana they happen to be entangled, w1 th certain epiettla)logical 
theories.• 
Milton Munitz 1n hie article, "Ideals and Essences" in the above 
volume, p. 214, expresaea a •'•il•r notion. "For it we look 
closely, the onto log or essence, instead of being an anteoed.ant 
loCWJ for its exploration by but~~m experience, beara the mrke, 
on the contrar;y, of' 1 ta original h\ll'O&ft incidence allC! geneaie • • • 
the realm or essence retlect.a in its oon&titution tbe properties 
and attitudes which lie at the blttoa ot ita conaeption." 
-4. 
belief is reason enovgh to pursue his method or skeptioia to its 
logical ooncluaion. Only then can a judgment be made as to whether 
the discovery of essence. as a primorida.l form or being, is an 
inevitable reward or this radical skepticism. 
The stages or Santayana Is methodological doubt "represent 
only a possible order or evidence, or depths of assumption and 
presupposition involved unawares in what we call reason."l 
Santayana's use o£ the word 'possible' weakens the necessity with 
which these presupposi tiona are reveal.ed 1n his skepticiSIIl, but 
they remain, nevertheless. the s.ame •inescapable elements"2 referred 
to in Realms or Bei!l£. In a word tluq are the necessary condi tiona 
tor thought to occur. It Will not come as a surprise then to 
discover essence to be one of these conditions nor that essence is 
"the last residuum or skepticism and ana~s1s."3 So the methodological 
skepticism even it it taUs to demt>nstrate the relation betll'eeft 
essence as a last residuUl!l or skepticism and as a primordial form 
of being, will purp>rtedly not taU to provide one or the necessary 
conditions for thought. 
The method of Santayana 1 s skepticism is presented in Chapter 
I. Through an exercise of doubt, belie! in knowledge of tact is 
suspended and the skeptic faces a solipsism ot the pa.saine moment. 
1s.ntayana, "Apologia Pro Mente Sua," Tru. PhUosopl)y of Q!ore 
San!:a.rana. P• 517. 
2Santayana., }!.ealms ot 8e!pg, p. xxvH .• 
.)T~e Works of Geore ~.,. Triton Edition (Jew York, Charles 
Scribner's Sons, ~l , ol. VII, p. Xi.H .• 
,. 
This eolipsism reveals only a aucoesaion ot appearan4»s, each 
ot which Santayana defines as an essence. Essence so presmted to 
the skeptic is detnonstrated to be not knowledge but lll8reJ¥ the t'irat 
stage ot knowledge - the content of intuition. 
Essence operative 1n transitive knowledge is invest.ipted 
1n Chapter II, as the second phase of the knowledge prooeea. The 
presuppositions or transitive know1edge and the limitations ot 
intuition are ma<;le) evidct. The cognitive relation or intent, 
not present in intransitive intuition, appears as one or the reaturea 
distinguishing between transitive and intransitive knowledge. This 
relation or intent is examined in relation to the pqche and essenoee 
as a condition for knowledge. 
Both Chapters I and II draw heaVily from two articles in 
Obiter Scrt,pta (19.:36), "Some Mean1ncs ot the Word. 'Is'"• aDd 
"~bollc Knowledge" and one article in Enazs in Critical 
Re!ll• (1920), "Three Proofs of Reali•"· 
Chapter m examines the doctrine of essence rrom an ontolo-
gical point ot view. 11rst, the notion of pure Beine and its 
relationa to other essences is considered. Then the propertiee 
ot essences which c1 ve them their tmusual ontological statue are 
defined. In particular, the contingency or matter will be contrasted 
with the neceaaity of e.esence with the purpoae or making a defin1t1n 
d1ati.nction between theae realms ot being. An effort ia Mde 
throughout this cbaptv to ehow the dependence of eaaencea ae terms 
ot lmowledge on the Pl'Qpert.ies of eaaence as prl.morc:lial f'onu or 
being. 
6. 
Chapter IV is a critical evaluation anci ooncluaion of the 
three precedi.:ne chapters. The Cl"iti.ciam focuses on a questionable 
JDO<le of inference used in the methodological skepttot•a a con-
tusion between the term.s 'extatencu.' and • existent 1 ; and the 
dis~i.nctton between esaence and uiawnce which render• oauallv 
and inference lHII.Jlin&lesa. 
, 
INTRANSITIVE KNOWLEDQE 
The history or phUoso})l\y recorde two antithetical trends 
in theories o! knowledge. 'l'here are those persistent attempts 
to achieve intuitive~· ce1 ..... a.1n knowledge at one extreme and the 
effort to attach trapc sign1fioa.nce to the fact that these attempts 
have repeatedly taUed on the other. Santayana is not of either 
camp. His impatience <dth the first group is apparent. 
The notion thAt knowledge 1s intuition. that 
it must penetrate to the inner quality or ita 
object or else have no object but the overt 
datum, bas not been ca.rried out w1:t.h rigour1 
U it had, it might have been sooner abandoned.l 
At the same time his SJ.-mpathies are not With the radical skeptics 
who hold that because llteral knowledge of t.hings is impoaable 
"that the aim of intelligence is doomed to defeat and that thiDga 
as they are are unknowable. •2 
'!'he kind or knowledge natural to man, Santa¥ana believes. 
is not irrelevant to its source. The fault lies not with 
knowledge ;eer .se, but rather with the expectations of men which 
so far exceed the actual effectiveness of knowledge. Santayana 
is confident that if the natural llmitatione or knowledge were 
recognized, knowledge would be seen to fulfill its funot1on.:3 
l Santayana, Skept1c1a; •••• p. 85. 
2 George Santayana, "Symbolic Knowledge," Obiter S9!j.,Rta, ed.. qy 
Justus Buchler and Benjamin Schwartz (New York: Charles Scribner' a 
Sons, 1936). 
:3 ~·, P• 1.)4. 
8 .. 
In this chapter Santqana' s method of skepticism is traced 
as 1 t examines knowlqe clabla and def'1nes the presuppoai tiona and 
l.1Jiitat1one of such claiu. One 8UCb limitation is the 1nt.ransitive 
phase or a cognitive aot, OOJIIJDnls understood to be knowledge. which 
ie demonatnted not to be knowledge at all, bat mereJ¥ attention 
direotecl on a datum or ·esHnce. final.JJ', essence as the focus of 
attention ia brietJ..y characterized. 
1. The Need tor a Radical SkeptiOi• 
San~ -..ploys skepticiem as a method tor two reaeons. 
The first. is apparent to 1110at phUoeopbera and stated expU.citly 
1n Skeptic&!! and AnV.l Paith. •Skepticism is a auapicion ot 
error about. facts, and to suspect error about facts is to ebare 
the enterpriae of knowledge • • •• 1 Santayana • s claim is that 
often hidden in the nature or what we ref'er to as fact and what we 
believe as dopa are el'TOr and illusion. Belief is the aUent 
accomplice of error noh that when belief's are asserted aa tact, 
the,r beooce the 'f'el'Y 1nstruaent of deception. •Ideas become 
beliefs onJJ- when t¥ precip1tat1nc tenclen41es to action tbe,y 
pernade 118 that they are eigne or tbinga; ••• The belief is 
imposed on •• surreptitiously b; a latent aecbanical reaction of 
1W bod;y on the object producing the idea; • • • u2 Thia avgeat.s 
that it bellef is not 1n .,.. eenee jutitied then knowledge is 
not Yel"idical. That there ia just1ticat1on tor one• a belief& is 
lsanta.rana, SktRt:1c1• • • • , P• 8. 
2 Ibid., P• 16. 
-
9. 
Santqana•s operatinc faith tor he admits, "The sequel will show, 
I trust, that this is not the aaee, that intell.iga'lce is 'tv nature 
veridical, and that its Ulbition to reach the truth is une and 
capable of satl.ataotion,. even if eaoh of its efforts actually faUa. "1 
How each ettort can in itself taU, yet at t.he aaae time just1ty ita 
ambition to reach the complete truth, l.s the pl.111 t.oward which 
SantQ"ana r.chea 1n Skefl!iciem and: An1!al F!ith. 
Santayana' a lkepticiea takes two birds with one stone by 
conf'inrd.n& his dos-tia that, "In an observable biological senH, 
knowledge ia poeaible, and., on the Aile biological groacle, tbat 
knowledge is relative.•2 Skeptici• brings this teat ott •trom the 
1na1cie and analyticaJ.q") b,y diatinguiabing between two cla1aa 
to knowledge, one prone to error but ver1dioal, the other, lslediate 
apprehension of i;.he data, but tautoloeical and not knowl.edge. The 
tormer Santqana naMe transitive knowleclce; the latter is 1ntran-
aitive.4 
The veridical claill or knowledge depencla on this distinction 
between tbeae two k1nd.a ot lcnowledp - one tnma1t1ve and 8,YIIbol1c, 
the oth.-, intransitive and literal. Transitive .-bolio knowledge 
ot tact is qy nature prone to error and illusion. Intranaitl.ve 
lrbid., P• 9. 
-
2Santayana, "Apolog1a Pro Mente SUa.• The PhU.oaoptw of Georse 
San;t.an!!!, P• 51.5. 
3aantayana • a anal3tical aetbod is tile recovery ot aa8UJiptiona and 
prewpposl.tl.ona in what we call r•eon• it is to ret.rieve the eimpl.e 
.troa the ooapl.ex. 
4Santayana, "Symbolic ltnowlecige," Obiter Scripta, p. 129. 
10. 
literal lcnowleclge, on the other band. ia intuitive knowledge and 
without error.l The inmic note or this distinction ia tbat knowledp 
ot existent thinca ia Vilneitive and can be bad 1n no other vq. 
Hence all veridical olaima of knowledge are pertinent. only When 
considered in relation to tranait.ive knowledge. 2 
Our worst. dittioultiea arise froa the aanaption 
that knowledp ot existence oucht to be literal, 
where&a krlowled.ge ot existences bas no need, no 
proP,ensiv, and no titneaa to be literal. It 
is taeolic spontaneolUJl¥, and 1 ta function (by 
whiCh I mean ita mral function or not: l•vinc 
us 1n the dark about the world we live in) ill 
perfectly Mt1Ued it it remains qmbollcal.3 
'l'hings and events known on:q t..hr'c)ugh tranaitive lc:nowl.tse reneot 
the very nature of the IQ'1Ill::cla which reprennt the, tbu relin· 
quiahing tbelr own idettv.4 The nature ot 1ntrans1t.1ve knowledge 
will be 1nveaticated 1110re tboroughl7 in the tollowlng chapter~ 
it is enough here to realise that any .lmowledge of existent thine• 
ia tv nature tranaitive and zoerta1n. It unoertaint.T is to be 
remved and the indubitable reached., Santapna' a akeptici• muat 
alice away the transitive 11nguiet.1c tiner.r b,r auapenc.U.nc the 
"wild. propenait7" to bel.ievt,.S thus revealing a 1giYC, • 
unequivocal and unbiaaecl to intuition. The reason then tor this 
method ot provleional d.oul* ia to reach this indubitable literally 
qy wapending tranai t1 ve lcnowledp and all ita contederatea. 6 
1Ib1d. • P• 129. 
~., P• 
2IO;d., P• 1)4. 
4Jbid. , P• 13'7· 
SSantqana, Sl<eptioipa · • • • , P• '?). 
6 Tbe conf'ederatee are faith, memory, tenu ot discourse and int.at. 
These will be considered in Chapter II. 
11. 
Once in run poaaeaaion ot the indub1t.able, the tutill~ ot 
one's solipsism is app&rent; it i.e not somethlnc one oan live with. 
Solips1e does, however, reveal the conditions neoeaear.v t.o breach 
this solipsism and gain an etf'ective knowledge of' oneeelt and the 
world. Plain)¥, it reveals the conditions tor tranaitive knowledge 
1. e. • an act of' ta1th, the unsubstantial terms ot exper1«tce, and 
the 81llbolical nature or knowleclge.l 
Santay'ana 1 a expllci t reaaon tor employtnc akeptlcia vu 
because of' the error inberent 1n transitive lcnowledce. The second 
reaaon is leas .rtdtrnt in the sense or 'being underplq«i in 
Skeptioie and M1!e! Fa1tb, but perbape oan be upl.ained qy 
Santayana • s sense tor the draaatic rather than hie feeling that 
it is less important; the second rea eon deals po1ntedlT with his 
doctrine ot essences. It Santqana revealed tbat his akeptiei• 
was a calculated aethodological device to rea<th and defil)e eaaence, 
the re.der 1110ul.d be aupicious ot its purity. But. b,y adm1tt1ng 
no such thing, Sant.&3'81'1a proceeds under the assumption, and a 
true one, that his ettorta are merel7 to reach the indubitable 
tv suspend.inc those beliefs and aooou'trslents wb1ch cnal.tivate 
error. That the indubitable happens to be essence is aot pbUo-
eopbioal cbicaneJ7, bQt the _,. things ee. 
lSantayana, •Apol.Dgia Pro Mente Sua, • The Ph1loaopb.y ot G!ozoe 
San\!z!¥, P• .517 • 
12. 
2. The Method ot Radical Skeptioi• 
S&ntqana' e method ot skepticism btgine as did that of 
Descartes - 'by doubting, but this effort tempted Santlqana, as it 
seduced Descartes, to assert that the aot of doubtinc 1111pl.1es the 
existence of a doubter and hence thinker. Santayana teel.a, "an 
inatant complex strain ot existence, forcing me to etq that I 
think and that I am. ul This insistence of experience to a ... rt 
1tselt' implies a relation between a selt experiencing and the 
existence or that Mlt. 2 'l'hat there are two such separable el-..nta 
ae a aelt and experience or peraon and situation Sant.qana admlta, 
but olaasitiea both as contincent biological truths.) Descartes• 
intention waa not merely to establish biological t.ruth8 but rather 
a neoeasary truth about one' e existence - a truth ot the aort. 
that it would be oontradictor,y to derv- that 1 am thinktDg and 
therefore exiatine. But it the ooc1t;s! erg BUll is to express nothinc 
bu.t a neoeaaar,y truth then tbe atatemeftt., •t aa aot. thinld.Dc" murt. 
be Hli...cont.radictol"1'. The posaibUitJ lillgera, botlt'W'9v, that 
althouch I u now thinking, I might not have been before. The 
eame applies to one• a existence. It is most assuredly a tact. 
that I exist, but not a neoea8&J7 tact. The posaibillt.y' ia al¥&78 
open t.bat. I did not exiat theft. Thus it follows that •t am not 
th1nld.ng" is not. Mlt-oontra<tlctoJ7. The only possible conclusion 
lsantqana, Skstioiam • • • , p. 21. 
2 Ibid., P• 22. 
-
.)Ibid. 
-
.. 
• 
1) • 
then is that the co,ito does not express a neceasar:y truth. But 
U' lmderatood to mean, I exist .!:! I think, the 2911to does express 
a necessary truth. But this truth is based upon an a&sl.lllption 
which Descartes never makea explicit.l The truth of one's 
existence follows from the tact that one is thi.nking. It is 
simply an analytical statement which expresses no zoore in the 
predicate than is already expressed in the subject. 2 In a word, 
it one is doubting, it ent.a.Us a doubter and thus the existence 
of a doubter. It is a mere tautology to say that it I am doubting, 
a doubter exists rather than a necessary truth about. an exiat.ing 
pereon.3 It merely exemplifies a rule or logic, a way of using 
words. 4 ThWi one' e existence is not guaranteed by the intuitive 
truth or the statement. <»&ito •m sum. 
It is Santayana's ,position t& d~ that two such el.eaents 
as the self and the object of the selt are given in intuition. 
The skeptic cannot rest with such sophisticated concepts as the 
'eel.£' and. 'situation' and JRUSt proceed to the 'given• which is 
raw experience without the subject-object distinction. 'iteelf' a 
gr8.Jil1Mtioal d1stinction.5 Santqana recognizes that, "Anal,ysis 
can never find in the object what, tw h7Pothesis, is not there; 
lAltred J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowlge (Hal"l''X>ndsworth, Middlesex; 
Penguin Books, 1956), p. 46. ' 
2santayana., Skept1g1sm • • • , p. 290. 
;Ibid. 
-· 4 Ayer, The Problem of IC:nowled.&•• p. 51. 
5Santayana, Skepticiem • • • , p. 22. 
14. 
and the object. or d.e!'ini tion ie all that is found •• l So the 
ael.t or ego ie merely a gratuitous as..-ption tor whlleh the skeptic 
bas l1 ttle use. What remains tor the skeptic is the •tact. ot 
experience • • • single and, trom its own p:d.nt ot nw, 
absolutely groundless, impoaeibl.e to explain and 1apoas1ble to 
emrc1ae.•2 
The •tact or eJCperience" then, urd.ntel'pl"et~ anc1 ~ 
etatized., is given the ekeptio in intuition. Tbis 'clYm' ia 
-.rela' an appearance, wbioh t.he skeptic views and about vbioh 
he expresses no opinion or belief. The skeptic 1a an indU'terent 
Viewer without expectations, ao that what appears, appears aa be 
Mea it. Taken in this sense the "given 1n intuition ia, qy 
clefini tion, an appearan01 and nothing but an appearance."' 
This • gi.....-n' is aoaeti:mea deceptive to the akept1o, wbo ..,-
at first 'believe that. one pba• is prior to another; whereas the 
truth of the matter is, the c1ftn is the whole of itaelt. That 
one aspect ia earlier or later than another is true OJll¥ troll 
one or another perspective. A perspective is that vantage point 
troa which the various phases are related 1n t81"11s or their belieftd 
aequace. This beU.wcl eeq~ Santqana !Wiles ap.oio\1.8 cbaDp 
and diatinguiahea it from act.t change. 4 
2lb1d., P• 24 
4xbid •• P• 25 
The unity of apperception which yields the 
eense ot Ohlmge ren&iws the sense of change 
specious, ~· rel.atinl the terms and d1rect1ona 
of cbanp toptber in a aingl.e perapeot.ive, 
as respectively receding. passing, or arrivinc. 
In so uniting and revi.ewtng the" tenu, 
intUi ti.on of cbange excludes actual change 
in the given object. It cbange bas been aet.ual, 
i.t must ha.:ve ·been prior to. and independent of. 
the intuition or that obanp.l 
The intuition of change reveals only- speeious chana• ancl Santayana 
stresses that specious change can onl,y be "taken aa a report..•2 
It epeoioue chaDge can be known onl.T as a report. then actual 
change is .forced even further troro the knower. •Aot.-.1 change, 
1f it is to be known at all, ltlWit be known qy belief an4 not tv 
intuition. Doubt is aocol'd.1nal,;r alwqs possible repJ'Iding the 
existence of actual change.•3 
Santayana's reluctance to know actual ohange follows fl"'m 
the pitfalls in repo1'tinc its phaMa. The intuition tlu"ovp 
which the skeptic apprehends the content of that '~Ut.ld.ttcm. 
1eolates h1m to that t:articular span. Aa Santqana baa already 
pointed ov.t. Within that span there is no before or after, ODly 
a now wbich ~. the whole ot 1 tselt. It, tor example, 1l01118-
thing is deeignatecl as past, that it rained last n1abt, u. is 
merely a term or te'tms 1ft preeent diiJOC)lD"M• Jut. it what we refer 
to reallJr happened 1n the past, that it actually did rain last 
night, that event is other than the term given in intuition. !he 
present moment or intuition will do no more than reveal the given 
at that particular moment. 4 'the past or future ean onlT be lalown 
2Ib1d., p. 26. 
4 Ibid •• P• 28. 
,i 
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qy relating the successive instances or intuition• this act.·ot" 
relatina is an act or the intellect which the true skeptic die-
trusts to begin wi.th.l If the skeptic is to remain a skeptic. the 
beat he can do is hug his solipsism and taka things tor what they . 
are as intuition presents them; none of these will be actual change. 
The distinction upon which our doubts about change rest is 
that between our feeling of change and our belief 1n cballc•· In . 
the first place. a feeling of change is given in intuition. '!be 
instances Santayana cites an the .tlapping of a tlag and the danoine 
fl.ame.2 This sort of intuition is "'more 1.!1\perious and direct than 
aey other.") But it is not Merely a feeling for change which 
gives us confidence that changes in things actually take place; 
rather, it is our belief in change. Such belief in chanp demand& 
some ansver to the question, what reason is there, •tor believinc . 
that over and above this actual intuition. with. the specious 
change it reprds, one state of the univerae baa given place 
to another, or different intuitions have eltietect.•4 In another 
senee, what reaaon is there to believe thiit chana• is not onl3 
specious but actual as well. 
SUch ju8t1ficat1on would not mean aerel3 to feel ia1ed1ate 
change, but rather to feel an earlier change which 7CJ\l. do not 
now feel. that is. "whieb. is not an integral part ot what. ia now 
before you. but a atat.e trom which you are suppoMCl to baw passed 
1 Ibid. • p. 29. 
-
'xbid. 
-
2roid. • p. 21· 
4 ~·· p. 28. 
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into the state 1n which 70u now arel "1 The irony here is that if 
you feel the earlier state now, no change i.e involved. I'or what 
is before you is, "merely a term in your present !'eellnc•2 and not 
a portion of the actual past. It is a present datum desi&nated as 
past. Santayaf\.a concl\Xies that, "If things are such only as intuition 
makes them, every 8\iggeetion of a past is falae. u:3 
Thus the feeling :or 1110vement, on which you so 
trustfully rely, cannot vouch for th• reali. t.y 
of movement, I mean, for the exietenoe of an 
actual past, once preeent. and not identical 
with the epeoiol1tS past nov
4
falling within the 
compass of intuition • • • 
The intuition itself then provides no reason to believe that over 
and above the present content of intuition an actual paet existect. 
If it did it would not be revealed "as a term in specious change 
now given in intuition."' 
In like manner, 6 Sant~' s skeptic181ft di.scard.a all entities 
available mediately through belief, such as time, memory and. sub-
stance. The on~ possession of the skeptic is the immediate content 
of his intuition. Th1s immediate g1 ven i.e what Santayana names 
datum and da!'i.nes as the whole of what is to be found. 7 San~ana 
defines this datum ~r.s apparent in two senses of the wo:rd. First, 
in the 5Emse of datum. merel,y appearing and beina \lnsubst.tUltial, and 
j Ibid. • p. 29 
-
5xbid. 
-
6santayana • s method baa been to doubt the existence of all .nt1Ues 
Not given immediately 1n intuition. 
1 Ibid. • P• "J7. 
-
• 
-
• 
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eecond, in the sense of the datum being self-evident and luminous.l 
In Santayana's words the "datum is a pure image; it is esaential.ly 
illusor.y and unsubstantial, however thunderous its sound or keen ita 
edge • • • • 2 In no ssnse do such characteristics as unsubstantial, 
self-evident, illusory and pure image bear testimony to the existence 
or the daturo. For all but the very stout of tnind, the iJipact of the 
datum, the questionable f'act that it is there, would at least. lead 
one to assume that it exists. But these epithets used to describe 
the datum not only imply its non-existence but assert that it can 
be grasped ilmlediately and entirely, that is, that the datum is 
obvious. 
Existence, on the other hand, can only be grasped mediately 
thro-ugh the gamble or a belief.) Santayana uses the 'IIR)rd 'existence,' 
"to designate such being as is in nux.. determined by extemal 
4 
relations, and jostled by irrelevant events." Exietence to be 
known must be experienced with one's entire animal heritage. The 
past, the itnpaot of the present. a notion or change from then until 
now, the relatedness of nature are all brought to bear qy us on 
whatever is. This complexus of actinties places things 1n a 
perspective about which existence 11187 be asserted. But rellOYe this 
vestige of a past, of a notion of change and an;r cy-pothetical 
relations such ae the notion or existence is retl'.oved too.5 The datum 
llbid •• p. 4). 2Ib1d •• p. )4 
3 29. 4-rbid.' 47. l'!?12.·' p. 
-
P• 
5~ •• p. 39. 
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ot which existence cannot be predicated, and which, until it ie 
used as a description or something else, eannot be either true or 
false. 1 Mere presence to consciousness or the datum or 1ntu1 tion 
is neither the necessar.y nor the sufficient condition or its existence. 
Sant.ay-ana. claims that it for the sake of argument he accepts the notion 
that presence to intuition implies its existence, be can disprove it 
qy a reductio ~ absurdum. His argument is that it nothing can extat 
which is not given in intuition, then ~ll the beliefs in existing 
facts beyond intuition would be necessarily false, and all 1nt.eUigeftoe 
would be illusion. The implication here is that, •u presence to 
intuition were necessary to existence, intuition itselt would not. 
ex1at; that is, no other intuition would be r1gbt in positing it 
• • • w2 Further. "Since proesenoe to intuition would be auttiolmt.·· ·•· ·. 
tor existence, everything mentionable would exist without question, 
the non-eXistent could never be thouaht of • • • n3 this wul.d 1n 
effect abolish all erfor and illusion. 
This argument that supports the proposition. nothing given 
exists, is central to Santayana • a skepticism and like all the 
skeptic's argumente follows a logi~ irrefutable pattern. But 
it is 1aportant to notice that this portion or Santayana t. arauzaent 
ia in one matter unlike that which preced.es it. The pattern of 
argument against the existence of the self; the denial ot cbange. 
IMIIOey and tact is one pattern and irrefutable whCl the skeptic dcdea 
what ia iaDediat.el;v not present to intuition. During that particular 
1Ib1d. ~1d., P• 46. 
'Ibid.. p. 4,5. 
-
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IDOif.ent or 1ntu1 tion his logic ie infallible. But in the long nm 
the skeptic's statmr..ents are false and proven f~alse ~ the very tac\t 
that his argument process af.f'ints his existence and all else that he 
denies. So that when the skeptic denies the facts of exieteoe his 
position is secure only 1LOmentnr1ly or if' he advmoes no al"g\IIIMlt., 
On the other hand the pattern of argullleflt that defends the proposition, 
nothing s;iven exists, is not a proVisional denial of .f'act.a. Santa7ana 
is arguing more than this; his argument is that the given is necesaarilT 
non-existent and this statement is a metaplv's1oal one. Santayana • • 
defense of it proceeds on the logical grounde alreadl' advanced that 
presence to conscioueness of the datUM of intuition is neither the 
necessary nor sufficient condition for ita existence. This al"g\IIIMlt 
does not depend as does the other on the moment of intuition to 
pl"'tect it. There is no possible faot to contradict. thia aaaert.1o11 
and force the skeptic to retract his stat.e.ent. Santayana' a position 
here is definitive; the given does not exist. 
With this argument secure, the skeptic's purpon is tor the 
moet p1rt realized. It has been demonstrated that no f'act can be 
given immediately to intuition. Thia teat was acoompl.iabed first, 
qy sU5pending transitive knowledge. Tbie is more than a mere 
suspension of' one ldnd of knowledge; it ia a suspension of all knowledge 
which is a rom of belief. The reaaon f'or holding all euoh knowledge 
8U8pect is that, "transitive knowledge, though illpol"tant it t.rue, 
ay always be challenged, intuition, on the contra17• which neither 
has nor professes to have 8.J\V ulterior object. or truth, -runs no riak 
21. 
or error. because it claims no jurisdiction over aeything alien or 
eventual. ttl The content of intuition s1nca it can never be in error 
affords the skeptic the security he demands but his argument advances 
one :r.ore step when ho dem.::>nstra.tes th~t the content of intuition does 
not exist. "The quality of it /Jhe oonte!'lt of intuitiori] will have 
ceased to exist: :1. t will be merely the qu.li ty which it il'lherently. 
logically and inalienably is. It will be an ESSENCE. u2 The ftcy 
c-ondition for apprehending the intrineic essence of a thine is to 
suspend. one' a belief in things not given. The possibility remains. 
however, that one mi.ght 'believe in the given as a kind ot knowledc•· 
This too can and must be pureed on the grounds that wherever there 
is belief there is also the possibUity of error. For the last 
possible source of error to be removed is to accept the g1. ven as 
illusion so that, "What will remain or this non-deceptive Ulusion 
will then be a truth, and a truth the beitlf: or which requires no 
explanation, since it is utterly impossible that it abould have 
been otherwise. "J Here the skeptic rests with 'What is indubitable 
f-or since nothing is asserted or believed nothing can be doubted. 
J. Essences 01. ven in :tntui tion 
Two properties ot essence, identity and universality, receive 
on~ brief consideration here since a detailed d1scusa1on woUld mean 
needless repetition 1n a subsequent chapter. It is neceasa17, howeTer, 
tha.t these properties be delineated so that in Chapter n, when 
1Ibid. I P• 70. 
-
2Ibid. • p. 74. 
J ~·· P• 7). 
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essences function as terms of' knowledge, these oharacterl.a't1ca Which 
terms preeuppoH wUl be apparct. This section detinu the propert.lea 
of .. aences given iramediatel,y to sense for two reasons: f1ret, tbe 
properties of aense-g1 Yen essences are identical to thoee ot thought-
given essences. These ... properties are considered later 1n an 
ontological context with relation to thought. Secondl,y, sense given 
essences are mre consiatant with the radical skepticism ea;>lo7ed. 
thus far, since the appearance the skeptic faces is aenu giv.n. 
This section considers the properties of a particular uaence, the 
color green of the wall before M, given in a 1110~\'le~lt ot sensuous 
intuition. 
It •• e.tabliabed in th4l previous section that aoquaintanoe 
with essence is not knowledge of' tact. At the mat, the skeptic 
faces a "non-deceptive illusion• and this Uluaion 1a a •truth the 
being of which requirea no eJ~Planat1on."1 What Santapna aeans is 
not that tbe skeptic akes a claim to truth as he migbt it be asserted 
a propoeition which agreed with the taots. Sis abstention troa 
making this claiM is the condition tor his expoaure to this truth. 
The skeptic is never 1n poaaeaaion of it in the sanae ot knowing it. 
In a s1milar sense the skeptic is not aware ot the properties which 
give this appearance its uniq\'18 statu - except upon reflection. But 
it is obvious upon reflection that tn. content ot his intuition lllUa't 
have some cbaraoterletios wtdch d1atinguish this appearance (....nee) 
from the tact of its appearanoe. OW skeptic is forced tbc to 
2). 
mmentarlly withdraw from his contemplative state and. consider 
t.boae properties which give essence a status distinct fl"'m tbat of 
a fact. 
Suppose, for example, that the oolor green of the vall be!'ore 
me is the content or intuition. The ekeptie as he oonsid.ers this 
green datum races an id•l object without aignitioanoe to bill but 
with •aeethetie 1rnmed1ac;y and logical def'1n1t1on. • 1 lnaamucb as 
this datum, as the content of intuition, is iaediate~ given, the 
po811ibU1 ty of essence being abstract ie discounted. A.bnract.ion 
is an intellectual activit.,y and oeours only when the thing itaelt 
is given and the essence is abstracted from it. But in intuition 
the essence is given before the th1n&' is perceived. Sa.ntayana 
dogmatically establishes that "Having never bMn. parte or an;y perceived 
object, it is impossible that essence ebould be abetracte4 troa it. ,.2 
On the other band because the esaence ie not abstract it cannot be 
constrwld that the essence or green dat'UII is a particular 1n the 
sense or a particular existing thing. It ia plain trom the previous 
quotation and Section 2 that particular things are not given in 
intuition. This does not preclude the poaaibillt)" that the pYC 
is 1nd1Y1clual and uniQue in its own right, however. Ae a atter o£ 
fact, the shade or creen before .. ia vn1que and there ia no r•eon 
wtv' it should become lea a so when Yiewecl tv a skeptic. The rea.on 
tor this absence of w.gumeaa is that the shade of green before me 
hae an iclentit7 whieh diatinguiahee it from all other sbades. Its 
l Ibid., P• 15· 2 ~·· P• 94. 
ind1viduallty is assured. Santayana describes the logical identity 
of an essence as "the quality which it 5he esaenci/ inherently, 
logical.ly and 1nalienab]J is.•l Such identity means that eaaences 
or data have a positive character or quality aoout them which distin-
guishes them from what they are not. In this MnH an usence or 
datum has identi~ in eo far as it remains id.ntical with itselt 
and ditf'erenee in eo far as ita identity distinguishes it trom all 
other essences. 
There is a senu, however, in which essences ld.cht be thought 
to lose their ind1v1d.uality, when. for exaropl.~ 8JV' instances or the 
same e&NnCe appear. For example, if tbe skeptic • s attention is 
directed. to other portions ot the wall, the eame shade areen is the 
content of intuition. How then oan eaoh eesence or dat'UIIl viewed, 
remain 1nd1v1dual i£ the saJDe ahad.e is repeated throughout the l"'OOa? 
Santayana claims that each instance or the particular shade ot green 
is an abodiment of the essence ot that pu-ticular shade of creen• 2 
This feature of essence renders it univereal but not to the detriment 
of 1 ts indi •1dua.li ty. 3 The eseence still n~~D&.ins uniq~ individual 
as a shade ot green unlike all other shadu or green. The tact that 
instances eaibod3 this particular essence in no 'Wa7 ettecta ita 
incli:nduality. SUch embodiment is important 1n another sense. 
For ·instances to be recognised as instances of the saa kind, the 
inatanoea must be more than particulars; they aust ~ \mi. vereale 
capable of being reproduced or called forth. Santayana• a illustration 
~bid •• p. ?4. 
'~· 
2 Santayana, RealJil8 ot S,i!JI• p. 18. 
is copies of books. 
Such Enbodiments or viwa of 1 t, like the copies 
of a book or the acta of reading it wUl be facts 
or events in nature (which is a net ot external 
relations); but the copies would not be copies 
of the same b::>ok, nor the readings readings of 
it, unless (an 1n so .far as) the same essence 
reappeared 1n them all.l 
In a similar sense essences are repeated 1n thought or recalled 
in meroor.r and it is aaS'UIHd that these eseenees referred to are the 
same as those entertained originally. The grounds tor such an 
assumption are that the essences entertained be universals and 
capable of being recalled in their almost identical form. 
Physical obstacles to exact repeti tiona or repro-
duction• do not attect the essential un1versal1t,-
of every essence, even if by chance it occurs only 
once. or never ooCNI"a at all; because in virtwt of 
its perfect identity and individWllity, it cannot 
fall out of the catalogue or eseences, where it 
fills its particular place. 2 
The universality of essence then appears as the condition for the 
appearance of instances of the same kind~ the recognition or 
instances of the same kind and the repetition of eesences in thought. 
The property of universality complements the individuality of essence 
by freeing essence from any })b3's1cal context thus allowing it to be 
repeated in thought and manifested in t.hings.3 
Thus far, both properties considered, identity and univeraality, 
characterize essence. The remaining properties, :non-existence, 
infini ~ and eterrtt.y do also but are not so relevant to terms of 
ltbid •• p. 19. 
3~ •• P• 18. 
thought. The relevance or these three properties is to the ontolog-
ical status of essence rather than the epistemological and are considered 
in detail 1n Chapter III. 
4. SUrraary 
The .first stage or Santayana • s skepticism advances a tra-
ditional euapicion of knowledge. Tl'-.i.s skepticism discloMs tbat 
inherent in knowledge or fact is error and unoertaint-7. due to 
bel1e.t and interpretation. It tmcertainty is to be ·pureed trom 
our knowledge, 'belief and interpretation muat be suspended. The 
result or this suspension or judpent is a solipsiD or the present 
DK>ment. Within this solipsistic moment all thought of the past and 
expectation or the future is purged. With the interpretation of' 
tact SWJpended, t.be skeptic is merely exposed to fact w1 thout 8f.G" 
knovledae about it. The reaaon for this is that the content ot 
intuition JJ1U8t be interpreted 11Y relating it to other contents tor 
it to be knowledge. Knowledge or .facta, such as chana•• time, space 
and meMOry are not given 1n intuition. What is is mere~ a datum 
ol" appearance. Even the tact or the datum's appearance is not given 
with the appearance itself'; the tact or appearance can onq be preataed 
trom outside the datua, that is, through the gamble o£ a belief. But 
the skeptic's position is secure onlT within the moaent ot intuition 
for the skeptic•s argument process affirms his existence and all 
that. he sets out to deqy. In any case the skeptic's arg\alent proves 
its point and that is that without belie£ the mere presence to 
intuition 18 neither the neoesary nor the suttioient condition 
tor the existence or the given. From this santayana concl\Xies that 
nothing given exists. This non-existent, intransitive given is then 
named an essence. The properties ot essence are identit.)t, univereality, 
infinity,. eternl'V.and non-existent. These properties function as the 
necessary conditions for thought to oeour. 
• 
• 
• 
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1. Introduction 
In Chapter I, intransitive knowledge was demonstrated to be, 
at best, wishful thinking; since all judgment is withheld, intransitive 
intuition gives only acquaintance with essence. Without judgment, 
error is impossible and the resultant truth or falsity of the jud.gJrlent~ 
knowledge cannot occur. The most elemental form or cognition is that 
actiVity of mind which makes j\ligments in which er.ror is possible. 
These judgments may be merel,y judgments or recognition or more 
sophisticated judgments of the sort A is B. But in any case, they 
yield either truth or falsity. Thi.s chapter examines essences as 
integral to thought in tra.neitive kncwledge judgments. 
One of the conditions for cognitive judgment is that thought 
r.ave a content with which its operations can contend. This content 
of thought vas realized in the previous chapter as the content or 
intuition or essence. S1Dlultaneously, this essence was det1ned as 
primordial form of being w1 th a n.riety or properties which distin-
guish it as a. di.f'ferent order of being from existent things. How 
such forms or being enter into existential relations to !'tinction as 
terms of thought and disoourse is examined in Section 2 of this chapter. 
Section ' describes the animal mind as the existential force 
whieh employs essences an in so doing proVides them with an existential 
mra.nH'estation in discourse. The use of essences as thought content 
29· 
occurs in .two ways. In cognitive judpents essences are related 
either to essences or things. In either case the relation or intent 
which characterizes transitiw knowledge is present. When intent 
occurs so also does the essence intended gain meaning; it becomes a 
significant term of discourse. This relation of intent is considered 
brief'ly in Section 3 in relation to the ps;yche and then in greater 
detail in Section 4. 
Supporting this entire body or mental discourse and 1nolud1nc 
it are the presuppositions which met the blade or skepticism in 
Chapter I. Without then presuppositions thought never "gets oft 
the ground.• Belief, in the form of animal faith is undoubtedly 
mst important or the conditions for thought and knowl.edge to 
occur. Section 1 shows ani..mal faith and the properties ot essence 
examined in the previous chapter to be neceasary conditions tor 
j~t to establish the relation or .intent from the given to 
the not-given, the relation without whiCh transitive knowledge 
cannot occur. 
2. Assumptions Inherent in 
'transitive Knowledge 
Santayana makes evident in Skepticism and Anill18.1 faith that 
or all the beliefs doubted in skeptie1811'1 - the self. knowledge, 
chan«e, existence and memoey .. none are necessary truths, 1. •· • 
none are logically entailed by the essences given in intuition~ 
Essences do not reveal such truths because essences are self-evident 
and ta.utolocous; they refer to nothing bey'Gnd themsel:vea. santayana 
at.reases tJlat.. "The intallib1l1t.:;r of intuition is nothing to boas\ 
)0. 
of ••• 11 for if there can be no distinction within intuition 'betweE!ft 
presence or absence of illusion, then knowledge is "short circuited" 
for the sake of aesthetic pleasure. If there is to be knowledge of 
facts, the cognitive effort cannot be li.mited to the given essence. 
T'ne method of knowing is to proceed from the essence given to the 
not given. from the obvious to the uncertain. But there is no such 
movement without the presence or animal faith. 
In the knowledge of fact there is instinctive 
conviction and expectation, animal faith aa well 
as intuition of essences; and this faith (which 
is readiness to !!!,!. 101M intuitiv-e category), 
while 1 t plunges us into a sea of presumption, 
conjecture, error, and doubt, at the same time 
sets up an ideal of knowledge, transitive and 
realistic, in comparison with which intuition ot 
essence, for all its infallibility. is a mocke~J.l 
Tra.nsi ti ve knowledge with all its inherent inadequacies seta 
the ideal of knowledge. At the same time the recent exercise in 
skepticism holds up ar.tOther ideal. the logical possibility to doubt 
every transitive knowledge claim. !n this present consideration ot 
. 
transitive knowledge, this latter ideal serves two functions: first, 
. 
. 
it enables San~a.na to define the limitations of the transitive 
ideal of knowledge and second, to examine its presuppositions. 
Sow~ lines from Skepticism and A~al Faith explain clear~ what 
can be expected of transitive knowledge in :tts most ideal form. 
lsantayana, "Symbolic Knowledge, .. Obiter Scripta, P• 129. 
I might, tv some happy unison between nw ima-
gination and its generative principles, intuit 
the esnnoe which is actually the essence of' 
that thing. In that case • • • knowledge of 
existence. wi tbout ceasing to be inetlnct.ive 
faith, will 'be as complete and adequate as 
knowledge can posaibly be. The given esaena. 
will be the essence of the object meant, but. 
knowledge will raain a claim, since the 
intuition is not satisfied to observe the 
given essence paaaive]¥ as a disabodied 
essence, but instinctively af.firme it to be 
the easence or an existence confronting me 
• • • Therefore the moat perfect knowledge 
of tact is perfect. only pictorially, not 
evidential.ly. and. remains subject to the end 
to the inseouri ty inseparable from animal 
faith and from life itself.l 
)l. 
Transitive knowledce of fact is shown to be, at beat, 8,111bol1o 
and formed in the image of man. It is never literal. The faot that 
knowledge i~ symbolic and hence mediate is obviously not the reaaon 
for it being symbolic. The reaeon is that the ess.ence of a thing 
is not the thing itself. but the logical properties of a tbirJC 1rhicb 
·alone are capable of being known. 2 Even when knowledge ia coaixlet~·, . ' 
i.e., when the essence intuited is actually the essence of the 
thing, knowledge will remain instinctive faith. What remain& is 
the claim that the properties or essence apprehended are t.be actual 
thing. That they are never identical ia assured t&r the f'act that 
one exists while the other does not.) Knowledge then is do~ 
precarious in that it is not only symbolic and logically uncertain 
but that an act or faith is a condition :for it to occur. 
1Santayana, Skeptiei!! • • • • pp. 106-107. 
2 
Ibid. • P• 1)9. 
-
'Ibid. ' p. 122. 
Santayana uses the term 'animal f'ai th • in two distinct but 
oom.plementaey senses. In one sense he describes it as a "sort of 
expectation• which precedes intui tion,l by mere]Jr providing animal 
faith with something to posit. Used in this sense anial faith is 
an expectation that given essences stand for somethinc outside 
themselves. It is a readiness to J:ll.'&it th• as existing things. 
If knowledge was literal, animal faith would be wmeceasar,y. In 
a second sense, animal faith supports the whole knowledge etructure 
which depends upon terms of thought; the self identity of theM 
terms; a • self' capable of employing them and their f'ruit.tulness in 
aoq\lir1J11 a knowledge of things. With the exception ot the terms 
of tbovcht, none of the r.aining ingr«i1ents of knowledge are given 
in intuition. Animal faith in their presence is requisite. Tbia 
belief or faith in, 11the existence of mental discourse (which is a 
sort of experience), whilst of course not demonstrable in i tsel.t, 
is involved in the valldit.y" of &1\V demonstration ••• •2 
Preceding ar.JT knowledge of things lies the assumption that 
knowledge is possible and this aaswapt.ion is a sheer mtter ot 
faith. There is obviously ~ tacto eVidence which ll8,f oorroboraw 
one's beliefs but at no title is Santayana unaware that, "Corroboration 
is no .new argument; if I am dee.i ved once, I S7 all the mre read.il7 
be deceivai again. "J But the fact. l"eellains that it this • 8,Y'Ilbol1c 
rightness• or knowledge is not somehow justified, or it one• a animal 
lybid. • p. 107. 
)~ •• P• 11.5. 
2Ib1d., p. 120. 
faith that knowledge is veridical is without reason, then the entire 
train of man's experience would be false. 
The lWtations of the transitive ideal are threefold: first. 
transitive knowledge is always mediate and symbolic, secondly, the 
stability of the terms of thought is an .article of faith and th~, 
the veridical nature of knowledge is always open to doubt. 
Santayana's skepticism reveals the possibili~ tor intuition 
to apprehend aey portion of the nux of things and intuit an essence. 
This attention of intuition is the first phase or leap in behalf o£ 
transitive knowledge. It is the intransitive hal.f' o! the knowledge 
effort. "The leap of intuition, from the state of a living orcani• 
to the consciousness or some essence" is the initial phase while the 
second phase is the "leap of faith and action, trom the symbol 
actually given in sense or in thought to some ulterior existing 
object.1 The first leap, although less a leap than a phaae, was 
investigated previously and found to provide the terms wtth which 
transitive knowledge might break through its solipsism and be of 
use. The language in the above quotation reveals this change in 
function from what was first an 'essence• given in intuition to a 
'symbol' with the relation or intent between the organism and its 
object. With the establishment or this relation knowledge ie not 
o~ possible, 1 t has occurred. the t'mlotional difference betWMn 
essence given in intuition and essence as symbol is that essence 
0
'borrows nothing whatever from the observor except i t.s presence to 
1
oeorge Santrqana, "Thr-ee Proofs or Realism," Ese:ys in Critical 
Realism, ed.. by Durant Drake (L:>ndon, MacMillan and Co., Ltd. , 1920), 
P. 18:;. 
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him, which is perfectly adventitious to its nature, and not indi-
cated. nl What this amounts to 1s that eesenees are not intrinsically 
tem.a of thoughts or symbols but rather "primordial and distinct 
forms of possible being. n2 What intuition realizes is the ''intrinsic 
character" or formal being of a thing and only as an after thought 
do essences function as terms. 
They /j,ssencei/ beQOme predicates or adjectives 
when an animal psyche apprehending them is vita.J..4r 
preocou:pied with the pressure of matter. and with 
reacting upon that pressure• so that the given 
essences are taken for portions or qualities of 
the ~namic faet qy which the Psyche is confront.ecl. 
Save for that mst.rial preoccupation, the spirit 
would regard the essences evoked before it in their 
intrinsic characters as the adequate furniture of 
life for the moment, like an eagle 1n repose observing 
the aun.J 
). Essences as Terms of Knowledge 
In Chapter I, the content of int\lltion was found to be an 
object of perception, inwardly complete and individual. without 
e:xistent.ial relations. This content was defined as an essence or 
formal being. Contemplation of this essence was shown to proVide 
no knowledge oJ: the given essence. But in the preceding section, 
essences in addition to being the formal being of a thing were 
presented brief)¥ as symbols or terma of discourse qy means or which 
things are known. rhe present consideration is how primordial fonu 
of baing are transposed into existential relations to serve as 
effective terms o£ knowledce. 
l Santayana. "Three ?roofs o£ Realism," Es:ezs in Critical Realism, p. 18:;. 
2santayana, Realms of Bei!?£, p. 4JO. )Ibid. 
The first distinction to be made is between the essence of a 
thing and its existence. An essence is the 'what' of a. thing wbile 
the existence of the thing is the 'that. el By the 'what' of a 
thing is meant the properties or qualities which make it the thing 
it is rather than another. It is that property or properties which 
distinguish the object from SOl'l'l&thing else, for e::x:a~~ple, the 'what. 1 
of rey yellow pad would be ite yellow color; its peculiar reaUi«lqi 
its shape etc., which distinguish it from the table on which it 
rests. The 'that' of a.' thing is not its set of properties but 
rather the existential relations which those properties as8UIIle. 
It is those relations external to the intrinsic charactv of a thing 
such as the spatial and temporal setting in which it occurs; some.. 
times called its • factual• exiet.enoe. 2 
Another way to conceive the meaning of the 'that' is to recall 
all the relatione or entities not internal to the datura and doubted 
in our original skepticiem; change, substance, space, and tt.me. 
These comprise the physical context or factval existence within 
which the 'what• is manifested.. In the earlier akepticiam no 
evidence was found for the existence of the •what• of a thing; it 
was, at the met, an immediate given. Santayana insists that the 
existence of the 'what' is infeM"ed by the h'tD!m mi.n«l. 
lThe device 'WJ8d; in referring to esaenoe and exiatence aa a -.what • 
and a 'that' respectively. was taken trom Brand Blansha.rd•s expo-
sition ot critical real1S111 in The Nature c:>f ~t (london: 
George Allen and 'Omdn Ltd., 19:39), I, J>P. 41 · • 
2santayana, Sk!J?ti.c1am •••• pp. 4.5-47. 
The 'what' is separable from the 'that• for reasons other 
than the fact that •xistence is not given in intuition. Existence 
being in continual flux is in prineiple unknowable 1n that it avoida 
any fixed form. 
Existence itself is a wrd, extema.l to the essence 
which it may illustrate and irrelevant to it; for 
it drags that essence into .ome here and now, or 
some then and there• and the thing so created tar 
!'rom being identical with their essence at ~ 
moment, exist qy eluding it.l 
What Santayana means is that evan when essence and existence seem 
to be identical, as happens when an existent thing takes on a 
special form, they reu.ain ontologically distil'lct. In a word, thq 
are different kinds of being and can never be identified. But at 
the same time existence must have some form in order to be recognized 
and known. That existence and essence are net identifiabl.e, howeTer, 
does not preclude the possibility of transposing essence 1n such a 
way that an aspect of existence lend itself to :!"orm.2 '!'his does 
not occur as complete identification of the 'what' and the 'that'. 
The need is merely to bring together the 'what' and the •that' in 
a manner approaching but never achieving i.denti:!"ication. In short, 
essence and existence which ~• were eo careful to distinguish must 
be brought together again before knowledge or existence can occur. 
When essences function as terms of discourse, essence and 
existence are in ef'feet brought together. The tern.s of' diaoourH 
are existents, or 'thats• while what gives these terms s1gniticat1on 
1santayana, Real.!! of Beipc, pp. 109-110. 
2sow existence lends itaelt to essence is oonaid.-.d later in this 
aeot1on. It 1a sutfieient here to reallze that w1 thout manitest1ng 
or ~ing essence in some sense, existent things are not knowable. 
is the essence or 'whata• which the terms ~. Previous to a 
discussion on how the essence is •bodied or manifested tv the , 
term a more elemental problem is the identification or disparate 
essences. More precisel¥. on what grounds can logically independent 
and perfect forma or "-inc be identified in tranait.iYe knowledge 
judgments of the sort A is Bf Then, granting some juatitioat1on tor 
this identification, bow do easenoes enter into existential relations 
as terms of discoureet 
Firat, a jutitioation for this apparent. ident.itication or 
essences is suggested. In j\Jdpenta ot all sorts, some toftll ot 
the verb 'to be' 1e uaed implicitly, it not explicitlJ' between tM 
terms ot discourse. The word •is' pronounces a j1xigment ot identit.T 
between the subject and predicate tenu. 
The copula properl,y denotes this singulaJ" and 
exclusive identitq ot •ob term with itaelt; 
not only 1n the abatract case ot A is A, but 
also when the tena (!.:,&•, the triangle) is 
specifically determined up to a certain d-ane 
ot articulation (hi:.• as a plane ecloaecl b¥ 
three straight linea); an articulation which 
the verb 'lg, !!!, • • • • registers and posi ta • • .l 
Santayana claims this to be the "r.rost radical int!mate meaninc ot 
the word • is' • 2 Another aean1ng of the word 'is.' is preclicat1on. 
Used 1n the sense ot predication, the verb •ta• retlects the •nner 
in which essences, once given in intuition, are predicated. of ot.her 
essences. Here, the word. 'is', "ma.rks some propertq in what preenmtably 
has other properties as well, as in the formula A. is B. "' Santayana' a 
1Sant&Tana, "Some Meanings of t.he Word 'Is'." Obiter Scn:eta• p .. 190. 
2Ibid. • p. 191. J~., P• 200. 
,a. 
concern is that these two meanings ot the verb •is• do not become 
confused and used interchangeabl,y. For example, if in the .formula 
A is B •is' means identit7, the fomula is contradictol",Y. A. more 
concrete example is the statement, wine is red.. It the verb 'is • 
maries the identiv of the eubstance wine with the quality red, it 
does ac falsely tor, "wine is td.M and red is red but red is not 
wine nor (in the sense or identi t7) can wine be red. ttl But to 
assert 1d4Nltity is the strensth of j1Jdpents when properties are 
predicated or substances. From an ontological point ot View, such 
predication is an \111fair meane of naming since it is in ettect the 
identification o:f 'What ovght never to be identified. 
Essences present to intu1 ticm would never be pre-
dicated ot one &llether. or understood. to aignif)' 
~ but what the,y obvio~ are, were th.,-
not projected into a common place and tiM, the 
seat or a preaUMd eubstance, qy contusion with 
which the given esaences (in realit7 o~ terms 
tor intuition) aN repa.ted to exist too. 
The point of contuaion is plain but tor the eake of •phasis, 
the rea.tures ot predication will be uuined. Santayana 8878 that 
"Predication is an elaborate naming under pres~ ot aeneation 
or shif't.s ot thought; it is poe'tJ7. Intuition here mixes ita 
p1pents and lqs th• on stroke b,y stroke. •3 The pipMlts are 
the qualities or eaeences used aa tfi"ma of discourse. Disoourse 
proceeds by preclicatin& eaaences of other eseencea, that ia, by 
predicating att.ributea or a subject. Both the subject md 1ta 
1Ibid. 
-
2rb1d., P• 203. 
)Ib!.d.. ' p. 201. 
-
. . ,_., ·~' ) . 
attributes are little more than eesenoea given under the pressure 
ot lite • s aoti vi t,'. The tact that some essences are "used as 
subjects 1n discourse and &!lOme as attributes is 1 taelt only rhetorical; 
but it corresponds to the tact that in nature .,.. formal units are 
more constant than others. •l The ke.y to this conheion surrounding 
the word 'is• is giyen 1n a statement l:lu Santayana that, "Predication 
is nppl8Jia'lt.ar;y det"inition, and as detinition is never adequate to 
the faots, furt.her definition of them is allftQ'S possible. "2 
Predication even when adequate oan only approximate the facta. When 
the verb 'is' is taken to mean identity, it is either a gross exa-
ggeration or when ued corJ"eCt.l¥, a t.autolOQ. As a tautology it 
is a raere assertion ot t.he tonnal character of an object, t.bat is, 
it designates the ontological status of that particular eseence •. 
But if 'is • is to be taken in the sense or predication, it must 
not tranagreH the ontolocical puriQ' ot usence by identif71ng 
what is ontologioally separate, inde~.endent and \1llique. ln other 
110rd.s when a fact is to be deacribed or a .jQdpent made, predication 
always misses the target of' adeqvatel;y reconstructing the actual 
character or the object. This means that the qualities or ;properties 
attributed to a substance cannot be considered as identical to it 
but merely eupplementar.Y de.tinition.) It the essences noked were 
identical and adequate to the object ot which they are attn.buted, 
predication could be considered. as adequat. to the facts. Santa-
yana apbatioally asnrta that this ia not tha caee. 
lxbid. • P• 202. 
'Ibid.' 
-· 
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One r•aon for the aaataption that predication is adequate to 
the facts is the aaaUliJ)tion that the 'what t is an actual part or 
the 'that• or 1110re slmplJr that logical properties or essences exist. 
It is the logical identity ot the 'what' which prevents it from being 
identified with other than itself. To Wile t.his 'what' as an attri-
bute and predicate it ott existing substances is to force existence 
on logical propert.ies.1 The reeponaibil1ty tor this further con-
tusion lies vith a third aea.ning ot the verb •is'. At the .-
time that 'ia• denotes the "qualitative 1dios;yncraq ot &1'\Y essen•" 
it also denotes •existence. 8(.')118thing peculiar to the flux ot nat~. 
and only as aot\J&lly tlowinc•"2 B_.. a third meaning or the verb 
loOIIla into View - to exist• To predicate these etable forme ot 
beinc or tlowina existent things is to misconstrue the ontological 
stature ot easenoea.J 
Our consideration of essence thus tu has been abstracted 
tram the human situation• In objecting to the identitication ot 
disparate essenCfJs, we bave done so in the rarified air or an 
ontological. SUillld.t. To return to earth; ao to speak. we are confronted 
with man•s attempt to Ullldarstand it and himself. Within this coapl.exus 
ot events it is illpossilt>le to retu.in aloof and not violate the 
ontological purl ty ·or essence. It there is to be knowl.edp eome 
Violation muat ooour. lt is a mistake to take our l.a.nguqe litera~ 
and imagine essence to be altered in any serious respect by its use. 
1tbid., JP• 205-206. 
-
2Ibid., p. 204. 
'Ibid. 
-
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An essenoe may figure 1n a context which is alien to it l::G"' entering 
into relations other than those internal to it. In a word, essence 
oan be manifested in existential relations. Essenoe doee not lose 
its integrity as a form of being but rather gives form to that 
vh1oh manifests it. 
An example of such manifestation or exemplification occurs 
when essence is not sought for 1 ts own sake, but is used by an active 
mind, for example. as terms of disoourse. Tenu appear not as 
essences but as instances of essences. Santayana describes such 
manifestations or exampl1£ications as the •cross-roads at which tw 
worlds meet.."l 
Manifestation is an event, and although that vbich 
is manifested there, can onlT be an essence, the 
occasion and the setting transpose it into a new 
plane of being, the plane of' phenomena or ot des-
criptions, and render it, aa tbe Platonist& said. 
other than itself. It is intrinsica.l..ll' and inali-
enably eternal, yet here are temporal instances of 
it; it ie a universal, but it appears in particulars, 
landine tha such positive characters as th• 11117 
have; it is perf'ectl7 mambiguous, and nevertheless 
it is Ml"ged and oontund with oth~ essences 1n 
the nwc of things and of language. 
This "incarnation of essences 1n particulars" Santayana intends to 
be \lnderstood as exemplitication or manifestation of essence.) The 
probleM raised earl)r 1n the section ae to how primordial torms o£ 
being could be transp:>sed into existential relations and function 
as effective terms or discourse is resolved. This doea not daand 
a change in our original de!ini tion of' essences as primordial toras 
ot being but rather emphasizes various relations into vhioh tbs,y milT 
lsantayana, Realaa g,f h1nl. p. 121. 
2 ) lb1d., P• 120. !b14. • p. 122. 
- -
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enter When ''from being perfectly real in its own fashion, it becomes 
an illusion in some mind, or the momentary form of 110111e treacherous 
matter, "1 or when " ••• some phase of discourse, distracts us 
from it, and scarcely sutters us to observe it tor ita own sake. n2 
In effect, ess-enC$$ lose their ontological ri.iidity without sacn-
tieing their internal purity'. "Subetance, in the aet of takinc on 
and shutn1ng these forma, merely connects them in a voluminou.e 
nux alien to their several qualities.") Although the tl.ux is 
alien to their qualities it in no respect renders them con!WMd. 
or contradictory. ltsaence never identifies with the nux in the 
first place and in the second place the infinite variety of possible 
essences permits the flux to assume any form and. r .. in distinct and 
The 1nfin1 tr ot pure :Sein& renders it inevi tat?le 
that whatsoever tonn an existence mrq- happm to 
assuuae, that form will be eome precise essence 
eternall7 aelt -detined. • • • • Ine:xacti tude, 
approximation, imperteotion are not poaaible in 
the relations ot things to their essences; each 
thing at each IDMent is just what it is • • • 4 
The apparent rendering ot enence conf'UHd and ubiguous tv 
the relations into which it enters is not \UU'9al, however; it is 
possible in two senses. First, it is not eurprl.BiDg that essences 
as terms and names which :minda predicate ot things, tor the J83st 
part tit them 1mperteotly. 
lib1d.. p. 120. 
~bid. • p. 12). 
-
2nn.d. 
-
4nn.d~' ;pp. 122-123. 
Yet merel,;y this disparl t,- between ideas and thine a 
would be no anoal,y, because 1deae are not t.bine• 
but ideas; and ideas like "WOrds, may be excellent 
signs tor nente in the field or action, w1 t.hout 
in the lee.IJt ~sembling them.l 
4). 
This imperfect relation of terms and names to t.bi.ngs while at once 
the source of richness of expression falls short or expressing the 
precise structure of things. But the fault is not that of essence 
for no matter how inadequate the term fiJaT be, its inad.equaey is 
precise]¥ the inadequacy it is and takes its place as an essence 
in t.l)e realm of esHnce. Second]¥, the source of this nmaladaptation• 
o£ essence to thing finds its locus not only in the two contra17 
orders or being but in the mind which uses them. It was evident 
in precedin& passages that essences are first usan1.f'ested in intuition 
and then attributed to other essences or tb1nc• as properties which 
actually inhere. Here the pqche with ita natural limitations sel.dom 
doee justice to the complex structun of things in attribution. It 
' ·' ,· 
either predicates eseences too genC'Gu.l,y or sparsel,y according to 
its habits. Even when the preclication of essences to thi.nga fits 
to the point ot reproducing the exact structure, the mind seldom 
realizes that it is dealing w1th two ld.nd.s o.t beinc the identification 
or which is impossible.. The natUl"e and lilllitations o! mind is 
considered in the following section. 
4. K1nd. .. Its Cqmponents Psyche & Spirit 
For a clearer view of mind as it spans existence and essence 
with its terms ot discourse. the nature of that natural or.der which 
libid.. p. 12,5. 
-
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llrrdts the etfectivenese ot knowledge through essence is of major 
consequence. Santayana distinguishes between two orders ot organ-
isation. "one logical and the other natural ... 1 The logical order 
is the order of essences with eac:h elesnent isolated from every other 
05· its logical identi~. This ontological isolation of easancee 
excludes any inherent tendency w1 thin the elements to mean or express 
rrore than what they obViously are. 2 In contraposition to this 
logical order is the natural order, the principle of whici1 is con-
tinuity - the £act that there are no breaks in nature. The source 
of this continUity is matter and its very existence, change and 
development has a direction perpetrated by an inner 'Vitali~.. This 
kind or developroent and continuity is :f'orei&n to the realm or essence 
where each essence possesses its peculiar characteristics Witbou.t 
respect for the others. Santayana finds in the natural order an 
explanation for "the hidden atf1n1ty or tendenqy in the terms" or 
the "qatematic extension or concepts, so vast in scope and so 
specific, which the mathematician pursues, and whiob leads him 
sometimes to revolut.ionary discoveries, 11 or the "pregnancy in ideas, 
political or theological, which often renders them ominous, secretly 
absurd • • • haVing at heart implications which on the surtaoe they 
disown • • • "' That our ideas have such 1mpl1ca.tions Sant~ 
attr~butes to that level or organization which is "animate aDd 
proper to the iiU'late involution of the p.qobe in man ••• "4 This 
1Ibid.' p. 94. 
) Ibid., P• 94. 
-
~bid. t pp. 96-9?. 
4xbid. 
-
level provides the pqchologioal biaa for selecting aome essences 
rather than others. Without a pqcbologica.l bias the un or essence, 
"which alone renders potent 1n diBCOUl"se, or appllcable to a.ny 
subject of ulterior interest• would never occur.l 
In pracU.ce. thought guided. by habits of inf'erence expresBU 
this bias in its ju:igments of what ia. Our habits of interence 
Santayana describes as a ":Nlatively closed system or ao'VeMI\ts, 
and hereditar,-."2 It thought was guided by no habits or inf'erence 
and remained undirected actiVity, its assertions would be Without. 
consistency and s1gnit1cance. But thought, on the oontrar.y. 1e 
attention directed on essences. This attention ie, •no impartial 
exercise or spirit but a maniteetation of interest. intent, pre.. 
terence and preoccupation. A hidden lite ie at werk •• :; This bias 
or organ of attention Santayana names the Psyche. The d1rected. 
activity of thought is the mni.f'eatation of the Psyche. 
The Psyche is a "habit 1n matter" to be distinguished from 
another degree of life within the 'body called Spirit and again tram 
inanimate matter. 4 a,. Spirit Santqana understands "the actual 
light ot consciousness falling upon 8.1\Ything, ~, awareness, 
reflection and reoollection • .S Inantmate matter, the other~. 
is lifelesa, that is, incapable of reproducing it..U • In contraat 
to both liea the Psyche. without auch activities as teel1ng. intuit1on 
and thought but yet active in f'eedin& and reproduCing iteelt.6 As 
ln,id. • P• 97. 2Ibid.. 
-
:; 4 Santayana, Skeptici&lll • • • , p. 137. Santayana. R~ of Beine. P• J)l. 
Stbid. 6rbid. 
- -
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a mode or substance, the Psyche's functions, activities and life 
are proper subject matter tor the pqysical sciences. 
Santayana• s definition of the Psyche as "a sy"stem ot tropes. 
inher1 ted or acquired, displayed ~ li v1ng bodies in their growth 
or behavior" is no mon than a. description of those life continuing 
activities which any living organism possesses.l The Pecrehe as 
complexus o~ life continuing actiVities sustains thought and its 
reasoning processes. What is m'.:)re, as an •organ of attention• 
the .Psyche is not tree to choose its ol-m life-direction. It is 
pre-determined 1::w generic habits such as the need tor "~shelter • 
.!e!!!.!. mate, .!9.!!! off'sp~ • .!2!!!!. country. !2!!. religion. "2 Such 
'· 
predetermination is only' partial, however, for the eventual satisfaction 
of the needs varies with the individual. The individual Psyche 
discriminates .. not this, not all this, not merely this."' Discri-
mination or this sort remains quite general but education and the 
pressure or society make their markaand man' m needs and preferences 
become a oonauming passion for a partieular shelter, food, mate, 
country and religion. 
The Psyche then encounters what it does from the course of 
nature ou side it :and the pred1epos1tion or its needs hardened 'ttY 
habit. Thought, which it supports, is not as free to peruse essence 
ln,id. By •trope• Santayana means that peculiar fol'll that &1V event 
or series of events has taken. The trope or a Psyche ditters from 
the actual Psyche in that it cannot come into existence nor leave 
1 t. The trope then im ~ that subsisting form Whiob a Pqche 
displaye at tbat particular 110ment of histoey when it is talked 
about. The fsTob.e, however, is net juet one trope but a complexus 
of tropes that pb;rsical bodies acquire through heredity-. 
2Ibid.. , P• 91. 3Ib1d. , P• 99 • 
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aa one Jd.gbt think; it JllWit obe.J', "The same oonjoineci forces o£ 
innate impUl.se and CIUJ'tlial experience" as the Pqohe.l 
The exposition tbue tar reveals the .Ps,yche to be the seat ot 
thought but this is ofll¥ one a14e o£ the coin. Thought is an aot.iVity 
but not aerelT ot the .Pqobe alone. £or it it were. it -would be a 
blind activity without bein& conscious ot its direction. Actually 
thought is responsible to the conjoined natures ot the Pqohe and 
Spirit. The Spirit, aa the light ot eonscioueneaa, oonjcl)ined to 
the Psy~ procluoea the acti~t.y ot thought. Inherent in the aotiYitT 
ot the Ps,yehe and Spirit is a feature which provide it with the 
potential to &CCluire knowledge ot the external world and itHlt. 'lbis 
is the tendency ot the P57cbe to propel iteelt and in so doing displace 
the Spirit trom ita position aa inspector. Aa in animal.a so with 
an "the organa ~t attentio.ri] are ineVitabl¥ addreaaed to inter-
oourae w1 th relevant external t.biac• • • • •2 But Santayana ie 
aware that it is not ~tb th1nge that the td.nd has dii"Mt contact 
but rather the appearance ot thina•·' lfhe Pqehe and. Spirit seem 
to be caught 1n a aollpaia ot appearances. Santqana claims there 
is an unoonacious tendency ot the mind to poai t objeet.. apart 1'Joolll 
their present appearanoes which •reat.s on a vital COilpUlaion, native 
to the ~, imposing animal. taith on a epirlt itaelt cont.~tive • .4 
This compulsion to poait objects not given immediatel.l' ia a mtter 
ot animal expedienc,y. Santayana turt.her explains, "Under suoh 
1~. • P• 98. 2Iba4., P• ),SO. 
)Appearance ie another name tor datum or essence. 
4santayana, Rf!lma ot BelpJ, P• )50. 
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ciJ"ClJIUtances and vi th such organe /i.bose of the Psych~ oonacioua-
ness could not be pure intuition: it JIN8t needs be pu:re intuition 
cal"l"ied by intent. •l This relation of intent occurs when the 
natural impulses of the P8,1ohe distract con.aoiowmess trom the 
ill:uHdiate datum and urge it to judge the datum to be part ot the 
external world. In effect the mind posita tbe existence of objects 
ot which it has no baud1ate experience and then claims the appearance 
to be a part of the aotuall;y existing object. 
Tied to the Ps;yobe the Spirit is decidedly limited as t.o what 
it may or may not be conscious of but this limitation is in tum 
the condition for tbe relation of intent between the given and the 
not-given. Tb1s relation is sul'Hsequently shown to be the cognitive 
relation of transitive knowledge. 
The fatality which links the spirit to a material 
organ so that, in order to reach other things, it 
is obliged to leap; or rather can never reach other 
things, because it is tethered. to ita starts.n, point. 
except by its intent in leaping, and cannot even 
discover the etepping-stone on which it stands because 
its whole life is an act of leaping a'Wfl7 froa it.2 
The leap from the given of intuition is less a leap than a judgment 
made ~wugh the combined efforts of the Psyche and consciousness. 
The animal tendency is a "'suspense outwards, towards an object 
not within her organi•, •) which oul.minates in a judpertt to the 
et"tect that the given is l'IIOre than an appearance. that it is thing. 
But previous to the jud.p«lt it is the life of the Psyche which 
l ~· 
)Santayana, Reall1'.s of DeW<, p. JSO. 
2Santa.yana. Skepticism • • • p. 16.5. 
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expo HI consciouanesa to ftrious essences and in this sense limite 
consciouenees to its own habit. Even the judpent itself is not 
unrelated to the habits ot inf'erenoe of the Pqche's an1mal nature. 
In the preceding obapter the mind was hinted at as being the factor 
which manipulates eseences inoorrect.ly w1 th reprd to thine•· 
Santayana makes this plain in t-wo quotations where he places full 
responsibility for thought on the organ1sm of the Pqcbe. 
The 1ntu1 tion of the essence to be tho\llht of 
next, evan in the 1110at obYS.ous inference or 
ded.uction, must be generated b,y the mv-.nt 
of l1 ving d.iacourse, and b,y the circ1liiUitancu 
of ~ aniMal lite.l 
For the controlling force in reaaoninc is not 
reason, but in8tinct and oircuautance, opening 
up some path tor the Jlind., and pledg1nc it to 
eome limited 1asue.2 
The bab1 ta of interenoe or thought are shown to be clependent on 
the instinct ot the Payohe and the material c1rcnaatanoes which 
confront it. These babita of Werence effect the judpents ot 
the m1nd 1n a decided faeh1on. Ita .plo7J118nt of essences aa 
te:naa is serlous]Jr curtaUed to theee limited an1llal bab1ta. The 
manner in which these terms are relatecl in cognitive j~ts is 
consid.erecl 1n the followinl eecticm. 
s. Intent, Interpretation and Signification 
The precedinc sections established the combined efforts of 
the Psyche and Spir1 t as the existential forces which transpose 
essence into a different plane or being and in efteot prepare essence 
l.nnd.' p. 79. 2 ~·· p. 104. 
so. 
to be Used as a term ot discourse. Transposition occurs when the 
animal activity o! the Psyche reveals essences to Spirit and these 
essences become descriptive terms o! the things and events al:out 
which the Psyche is concerned. This use or essence demands con-
sider&~ more than attention directed on essence; it requirea an 
interpretation or the essence carried b,r intent. "Mere~ to pro-
long a present intuition will never turn the essence preeented 
into a goal or intent or a term useful in discourse • • • nl The 
relation ot intent. in effect, carries the interpretation of the 
essence as a tera. The nat\U"G of interpretation aDd the aubaeq'*lt 
signification 1 t establishes is the subject of this secrt.ion. 
For euence to 'become a significant term of discourse it 
JD.U8t be related. to other easencesi 1n a word, it liUSt be ..ant. 
"In meaning an eaaence we accordinc4' b,y no means tencl or wish 
to intuit it; but just as in the oase of Mterial objects of intent, 
we indicate its locus 1n the realm to which it intrinsical.l¥ belongs 
••• "
2 87 indicating the locus of an essence Santayana means that 
the essence is ei tber related to other e.snnoes or things in intent. 
In relatinC essences an interpretation occurs and the essence taku 
on a determinate ll'l8lUl1nC· 
santqana never explic1tl7 defines interpret-ation but ita 
aotiv1ty is evident on two occasions. Firat, 1n oocntt1ve jq-
ments or classification when essences are related. to eaaences and 
seco~. cognitive judpenta when essences are deeeript.ive ot 
things. In both instances, intent and s1gniticat1on are present. 
l~ •• p. 116. 2Ib1d.. p. 114. 
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In the first case, the relation of intent is present when m1l'ld 
relates a given essence with other not-given euencea without 
respect to things. In the aecond case the relation of intent ocoura 
when tbe 110Dl$lltum of the Ps;ycb.e' a activities require it to posit 
something solid or real bqond the appearance of which it is con-
scious. The presence of sicnification will be conaid.ered 1n a 
later context. 
The lll8thod here is to examine factors common to both ldnds 
or interpretation •. Clasaitioation appears to be the simpler of the 
two and involves a low level of interpretation. Clasaifieation 
too has maey levels or compl..xity but its simplest level is~ 
the determination of an essence as an essence or a certain ldnd. 
Its "locus"is 1n<licated. with relation to other enences of the same 
or different ld.nd. In abort,, it is distinguished qy ita class 
relations. It need. not be an object related to a class ot objeota 
but merely the color green related to the class of creen colors 
and diatinpished trom the class or all non-green colors. So 
merely to recognize green as green, 1.nter,pretat1on occurs. Inter-
pretation is eaei.J¥ reaogniaed 1n claaaitication of this sort but 
not so Obvious is the relation or intent which was aa1d to be 
necessary whenever an essence was meant. ~be relating of essences. 
however, is always with one or more 'believed' to have been given 
formerly •1 The rea eon for this is that two essencea can never be 
given at once in intuition. 
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U both terms· were s~ given they would compose 
a ccmplex eaeence, • • • knowlqe can nevv lie 
in the overt comparieon or one datum g1 ven at the 
eame time; even in· pure d.1alectic, the compariecm 
ia with a da:tUIII 1belieYecl1 to bav. bem g1ven torraer]1'.1 
At a lllOre aophiet.icatecl level claaaitication occurs in ~leal 
judgments when two ten&a are reoogn1zed as 1ntendi.ng the sae eeaenoe. 
For example, the stat-.nt ghosts are dinml'xMI.ied spirits is an 
interpretation that tbe term ghost and the term diaeabodied. apirit 
intend the UM essence. 
In the identitioation ol an essence giwn in one 
intuition w1 th somethina c1 ven in another • • • 
there is a postulate that in tranaeendent intent 
I u hittins a target .... It is mind, a spirit-
ual counterpart or attitude and action, that in-
tends in both oases to consider the same esaenoe.2 
Here the presence of intent appears to a minimal degree but al.ong 
with interpretation mu.st be pNsent it the terms are to have an;y 
meaniJlC. 
A m1.nbn.:a of' interpretation occurs when the mean1nc ot an 
eseence is made determinate in classification, that 1s, whe essence 
is related to essence. Interpretation is more ol:Rbu wbc intent is 
eet.ablished between essences and things. In Section 1, nfelWloe 
was made to two phases or leaps 1n lcnovledp: The phaM ot intui-
tion •rrom the state or a living organism to the conscioumus ot 
aorae essence," while the second phase involved "the leap ot faith 
and or action, from the symbol actually given in sense or 1n thoueht. 
to some ulterior existing object."' The f'1rst phase of intuition 
1Ib1d. 
JSantqana, 
P• 18). 
2Ib1d., P• 119. 
"Three Proof a ot Realiaa," Ks!!ls in Critical Realiem. 
reveals an essence uninterpreted b,y the mind. In tbe second pba" 
the essence is interpreted as a symbol or descriptive term th\1$ 
establishing a relation or intent between the lmower a.nd the object 
to be known. 
The relation or intent between essence and thing is similar 
to that betwMn essence ani essence. When the mind Judges the given 
essence to be in some sense related to a thing not given in intuition, 
the thing itselt is merel3 posited to exist. The relation of intent 
occurs when the momentum or the Psyche's actiVities require it to 
posit something solid or real beyond the appearances or which it 
is conscious. But the object is not merely posited. to exist beyond 
the appearance; the appearance is interpreted as a part of the thing. 
This interpretation is a judgment to the effect tl'w.t the essence is 
a particular tJ'!!ng or kind of thir!l• Obviously it is not, but since 
essence is all that is available to intuition, it is iJ7postatised 
aa a thing. Two factors are operative 1n such b)rpostatizat1on, 
memory and expectation. Expectation seems to be the more :f'unda., 
mental of the two. Santqana defines expectation as the sort of' 
instinctive conviction "the proverbial child» has who unmistakabl.T 
reaches tor the moon. "'lU.s instinct to touch the moon is as pri-
mitive as his instinct to look at it."l E:lcpeotation thua provicies 
a fun<l which when the mind is proper]¥ st1mul.ated recalla and bringa 
to bear on the essence presented. So the final interpretation is 
made in terms or this .fund or expectations. some 1nats.nctive. others 
aoeumulated in experience, which are brought. to bear en the essenoe. 
~bid.. p. 171. 
The object being thus identified by our bodil,y 
attitudes and qy its other ~sical relations, the 
aesthetic qualities we attribute to it will depend 
on the particular sense it happens to affect at 
that rooment, and on the sweep and nature or the 
reaction which it then calli forth in ua.l 
5/+. 
The first part of t.M interpretation is one or ~ attitude while 
the second has more to do with the content of intuition. this latter 
role of interpretation is exceedingl,y more complex than the tiret 
but the first is elemental and the basis of the aeccmcl. Interpretation 
may be as simple as the recognition of a thine !! a thing or as 
complex a judgment as Euclldean space has three diJilensiona or that 
the un1 verse is expanding. The essential ingredients of the juq-
ment are the same in 81\Y caae. .Firat, instinctive expectations 
automatical.ly poalt an objective content apart from the given ot 
intuition. Second.ly' • an interpretation of the given is lll8d.e on the 
bans of a tund of past u.peri.ences. that this given is a given of 
a certain kind with the ma.ny properties which other ._bera of the 
same class of th1.nga possess. These two, so called. ingredients 
ot transitive judpents are analy'Bed apart for the sake or expo-
ai tion bllt 1n actual judgment one does not temporally follow the 
other. They operate ailrlultaneoualy. 
Interpretation then, in both classification and deacriptive , , , 
j\ldpent, is similar 1n feature. Ita product, signification, is 
a1.milar as well. Whenever interpretation and intent occur either 
things or essences are defined. In a word, their aign1fioation ia 
eetabliahed. Earlier it was established that to mean an essence is 
,,. 
to indicate its locus 1n the realm to which it belongs. If it" !a.~,,.. 
a sign of a thing, it is related to the realm of 11latter; if it is 
an idea or term it is related to the realm of essenoe.l This vas 
precinl3' what oocuned in classification and descriptive jwipent. 
~ ·eays "th~s ara better afined in discourse than sensa-
tions. and intended eseences better than eaeences given.•2 It is 
not merely intut.tiftg the character ot a thing or essence that 
giTes it s1gn1t1cation but ra.ther the relating of it to the ldnd 
ot being to which it 1ntr1na1~ 'beloflls. The oharactel' of the 
essence is alreadJ' det.en~inate but until it is classified or relate 
17¥ an active mind its meaning is indeterminate. For an essence 
to ba'Q a determinate mu.nin& it must be recognieed as a particular 
~ ot essence and tor any auch reoopltion, interpretation of the 
dat'lllll as a 1dnd lllUSt occur. 
Even when an essence is present, l1ke the colour 
of the aq, I must retreat a little and rever\ 
to it f1ooJI a different intllitlon in order to 
identity or to mean lt; Uti this dif'tenn.t. intui-
tion is commonl7 that ot the word 'blue' , the 
name of that oolew.3 
The color ot t.he alr3' in thts ••• undou~ bas a determinate 
character 'but ita identitioat.ion as t.be ooler blue is a tranaitiw 
j'Udpent whioh relates 1 t to the olaaa ot b1ue eolo!'a. ~ theft 
does the blue alc;y baTe an,y a1pifi01Uloe to ws vbcl we loek at 1t 
or when we think about it at a later tlae. On.oe an ea.-- 1a 
meant and. has si&n1t1cat1on thouabt oan Nter to it tiM and ql.n and 
it will bear the same aipl.t1oation to u as it clicl when tirat interpreted~ 
1Santqana, J'!l!! ot leW• P• ll4. 
3Ibici. • P• US. 
lxbic1. 1 P• us. 
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6. Salalar;y 
The purpose of this thesis ae eat out 1n the introduction is to. 
de1'1ne essence by considering it from different· pdepectivee. The 
first perspective 1n Chapter I was essence ae given 1n lnt\Jition. 
The second perspeoti ve in this chapter was eaeence as the content 
of thought. More epeciticall;r, our ooncem was the mechanics ot 
cognitive ju:ipenta as th4o" cpl.oy essences ae e,ymbola or terms or 
discourae. 
Erfectiw knowledce about the world was demonstrated to pre ... 
suppose mental diecourse, that is, the capacity ot mind to .aplo7 
terms of cliscourse in INCh--a va;r ae to gain some 1na1ght tnto the 
etructure of thins•· W!. th the exception ot the enence given in 
intuition, neither Jldnd, tenu or discourse, an external world nor 
the eignlticance of aental cl1acouree are giTen 1n intuition. Since 
there is no evidence ot their preaet'loe in the g1 Ten ot tntu1 tion, 
then factors must be accepted on faith tor traneitin lmcnrlqe to 
occur. It knowledge ot tbiftcs was literal, an actual .-trace ot 
the thing known by the aincl, taith wuld be unneoesaa1"7. But since 
transitive knowledp is •Yelll.ent f1:oo'J1 the giftn te t.be not-ginn, 
belief in its oapaeity to 71elcl a knowledce ot thine• is requisite. 
The liven ot intuition wu shown to be either a tom ot be1ng 
or a term ot discourse depending on whether 1 t tunotionecl as a 
content ot int\:11 tion to be oontaplated. w1 thout juc:Jpclt or a 
descriptiTe term predicated ot thine• qr an actiTe ld.nd. Por 
essence to eern as teras, t.htv IIU8t enter into existential relatione 
OOilt.nry to their nature aa forma ot being. This ev•t -~ 
c:lesoribea as the exapli.ticats.on ot eaeence s.n ex1R4tnoe. It 
ocoure when essence "beoomee an illusion s.n eoae ld.nd, or the 
momentary form or eome V.oheroue •tter.•1 !xemplitioat1cm ot 
eseenoe enablee it to be used ae a term without OOI'Ilpi'OIIiainc ita 
internal being. Ita _ontologS,.Cf.l tntecn\7 ia aint.ained b.v not 
aotual.ly 'bHom1.n& an orpnlc part ot mstence bat~ lendinc •t'-r 
or tenu poai tiTe character. 
The terms or diacour• uHd. bY an a~iw aind .....-. to brldce 
the hlatv.a between easene-a and .existence. But the acti'f'11'.7 ot the 
mind is lim1tec! to the b&'bits of the ah1mal ut"" or Pqche 1n 
which it reaidea. thus restricting ita sCope and ~...,.c. patterns. 
So the term. or diacowae ..,... Ye17 S.nadequteq to render the real 
nat\U"e ot the aot.l. world.. It it were not tor the P87che, Spirtt.. 
the component. or ad:nd, would •rell' conteaplate a ain8le essence. 
But the ani1nal act.i'f'iV ot the Ps,yche diaplaeea oonac1oU8Maa h'oa 
ita seat of cont.aplator aDd involfta it ir,1 tn.tt1o with thine•· 
Ironioal.lT thouch, a1nc1 ie nefti" ocmeoioua of th1nc•• cmly euenoea. 
The bridge t1"'0l eseence to t.h1na ocoure tbro\llh the r4llation or 
intmt llhen the mind. jqee the g1 Ten eesenee to be 110re than an 
appea:ranoe; it judges it to be !Qt thing 1teelt. In reali\7 it ia 
JMI"ely positing the exS.atenoe of the thine 'beoauae the th1J,tc is 
newr siTen 1n experience. thia 1a the mannrn" the 1n vbieh eaaencea 
tunotion aa t4U'IIla. The,y are d.eaonptiw tenu ot an objectiw 
reallt-7, nature, tbat ia never ilaect1atel$ ciftl'l in experience. 
1~., P• 120. 
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Int•~~ b.owftr, il not the eole eot1p0nent or 00Cft1tive 
jl'ldpent.a. , It ia the PJ1M.l'Y nlattoa Mtabliebec! l::v ~,._t 
'betwem the giftn and the not-ct.-~ It mere]¥ car.riea tbe inter-
pretation of tbe given. Two ldnda et bltcrpretatlon an 4Wident; 
tire\, claeaU'ioation which 1a tM utablillbJD«mt of 1nt.ent betwen 
eeMncea and ..,oncll7, duoriptift ~t which 1a 1nt.et between 
•••••• and thin~•· 1ft both caMe •l&nitication oocva when the 
eaeaces or thine• are in~ in diaoourae., In other worcle, tbtJ.r 
&N liVen d.et.ei'DJ.ina\e -~· thlovp interpretation,. An eeaenoe 
or thin« baa ellftitication when S. t ie i'eQognis~ !! a thine or 
' ' 
ld.nd of thine. !*he given 18 related to the claea ol allllar object• 
either in the l'e&la of enmoe or •ttw an4 • dafi.Md. b¥ .theee 
claaa · relat.ionablpa. Wbc th'WI ctetlDecl it 'beccalae a lligniticant 
tel'lll ot theucbt with tbe •~&civ to )"leld krlowl.edge of thine•· 
,. 
1. InVoc.tuc\1011 
In the Pretaoe to the Beala of Matt.er. SafttqaDa detinea 
hia ala tbzoou,hout the ..tire a.]•• of Be1Dc. 
- Plf4bl• ia preoiae~ to d1at1ftpiab in thia ftat 
~ot ttld.atenoe the pl.aMa and qualities of N&lit¥ 
which 1 t oontaina or prenppo.... I vieh to note 
the ditt.-.ncea and the relatione "'wen the a.nt.te 
and the inani•te, the ptvaical. anr1 tM IIOral, the 
JX\yaiolocioal u4 the logical, the t.poral and the 
et.emal. It ia ftr7 true t.bat one aDd the .... nux 
ot ennt.a exepU.t1ea nov one and aow another of 
tbeae realu ot belnc, or 'ftr1oua~ iapincea upon 
t.n.; tNt thia ampbi.biou ohan.ot.er ot ex1at..noe ia 
tar troa be1Dc a reaaon tor not 41at1npiahinc tboM 
real.Ju.l 
The probl• ot thia chapter ia DOt ao 1ncluain aa that which prollptecl 
Santqana to d1aartminate the tow realu of being but at the .... 
time it ia not~- 1t 1n purpoae. Th4t purpoae ot th1a chapt.e. ia. 
to d1at1Dp1ah tboM qualitatln clitterenoea between the realms ot 
essence and •tt.er. The ..thod ia to delineate tho• propert.1u 
vh1ch · are peoul.iar to the realJit ot ueence and d1atincu1ah 1 t tro. 
the reala ot •tt.er. Tbeae propertiea urk eaaenoe aa a d.1tterent 
dimenalon ot being tro. tboH pz-opertiea or Ute and aeti'YiV which 
are cbaraoteriatio ot •tter. 
!be preoed.inc chapt.era abowd. theH propwt1ea to be blplioi\ 
1n e£tecrt.1w t.boucht an4 reaaon1ftc. An attempt •• ad• ln the 
th1rcl section or Chapter I to •• theM propertiH explicit and 
1Ib1cl., P• 184. 
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relate th• to their epist..,logical context.. A clar1tication ot 
these properties is carried out in this chapter but lus etfort 
ia made to relate these properties to eocrntion. Bach }=-'Operty 
will be considered from an ontological point or view and the ditter-
encea ot these planes of beinc accounted. tor 1n the properties th..., 
have. This ia not an exhaustive account ot the JIIUV' nuances of 
which Sant:qana wri tea bu.t a tr•tment of the major ditterencea. 
Some or theae properties have been diacuased. or referred to often 
arxi perhaps to the point or tud.liarity but the justification tor 
one laat look at essence •troa the air' ia that thia laat perapeotiw 
me.y rev•l some hitherto unnoticed oharacteriatica. 
This chapter considers first, Santqana' s notion or pure 
Beine. At first thovght, it JUlY • ._ inappropriat.e to de'ftte CNll7 
a section rather than a special chapter to pure Being. Tbe jueti-
fication tor including it with eaeenoes in general ia Santqana • a 
own, !or he eonaidera pure Being to be an easenoe i taelt vi th onl.7 
alight)¥ different teaturea fi'Oll that of an ordinary eaaenoe. The 
method or this aeetion ia to COMJl&re Santqana' a concept or pure 
Being w1. th a traditional notion ot Being to bring into relief the 
uniqueness of Santqana' a notion. Finally the difference betVMil 
pure Being and ordinu;y eaaencea is considered. 
2. Pure Bei.Dg 
Santqana • s notion or pare Being and dootrine ot essences 
avoids aome of the traditional probl_. a .. oiatecl with being and 
unity but in ao doing leaves itselt open to a critioi• ot reclundanc;r. 
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The poaa1'bU1 ty 11nprs tbat pure Beiac is IIIAINl1' another enenoe 
vhioh lends oompletcua tNt no additional aicn1t1G~moe to Santa. 
yana•a dootrine or eueDOe. This poaelble critlo1• ia ~~entionecl, 
not wtth the lrltent to ""judge Santa7a* • a notion ot pure Be1Dc but 
to intJ'Od.uoe another notion ot pwe Beine which ia not open to th1s 
same ld.D4 ot critic18m. A l:triet OOIIpllriaon or Santqana•a notion 
ot pure Bei.nc w1 t.h Etienne OUeon • s notion ot Beine aerYea to 
eont.:raet two aon'ts'aJ7 roles a concept of ~ Jllicht play in an 
ontolo&Y• 
QUeon, in the Preface to !!ipl and a... fhQo•EF•• (1949). 
proffers an explanation ot the relation or Bei.Dc to being. .._t 
is ttrat 1n realiV Deed not be what is .et aooeaie1ble to hw.n 
uncleratand1ng; it ia that vbo .. pi"M81'1oe or abeence etaUa the 
presence or abaenoe of all the rNt ot realitl' .. •1 Here ia the 
beciMinc of a tol"thricbt ..taptwaica.l notion ot bet.nc. OUaon' a 
use ot the verb • entaUa1 · ·i.a aore ahazop'q d.et1necl wben he expand a 
hie notion of .. taJ:Il\Yaica or the science ot '•ir.lc '\111. Beinc•'·· · ·· 
.1rl'he acieno. or being ctua being paa- into the scieno. of the 
first oauaea, which ltaelt :paaaes into the aoienoe of the tlrat. 
cause, beoauee Ooc1 1a, at one and. \be AM tiM, both the .nrat 
Ca'Wie aDd beiDc qua 'beina.•2 BeiD& tUft 1a a ~tlrat pro1no1ple• 
1ft the presence of vbioh the rest ot realit.,y auat occur am4 1ft 
whose abaeftce cannot occur. In abort, lei.ng ia the neceNU'7 anc1 
autticient condition for tbe preHDCe ot beinc· 
louaon, ltienne, Beift and §oM fb1loaop!)wa (Tol'Ol\toc Garden C1't7 
Preas Co-open.t1ve,94§). p .. ix. 
~., P• 151· 
•• 
• 
Santayana • s notion of pure Beine differs ·considerably'. In 
SkeRticiam and Animal Faith, Santayana express:l¥ notes pure Being 
to have no •lodgement 1n existence" and that it ia "onJ¥ a logiOal 
term ... 1 To bear this out Santqana coapa.res pure Being to pure 
color. 
Pure Being, as tar as it pea, is no doubt a true 
description or eYeJ'7thing, whether existent or 
non-existent; so that 1f ai\Ythine exists, pure 
Being will exist in it; but 1 t will exist merel7 
as a l'\D"4J color does in all oolora, or pure apace 
1n all spaces, and not aepara tel$ or exelusi vel;r. 2 
Two other references make paroe Beine out to 'be a universal whoa• 
being implies the reala of eseence. 
'Beine' itnlt, the highest univer>eal, is not a 
name tor all part1.0\ll.ar beings but a name tor 
their Vftr7 sensible OOJaiOft eeaence, by which Mch 
'being and all beinca together an weighted and 
distinguished .rphaticall.y troa nothing.) 
The natve of pure Being UQ'Where implies the whole 
realm of essence, since beinl could not poaeeaa ita 
tull extension 1.1' an;y sort. of being were forbidden 
to be.4 
The relation or pure Being to being here 1.a obvioual;y of a different 
sort than that conceived b.Y QUeon. Santayana's reference to pure 
Being as "logical term•, •univereal," or "name" which 1mpll.ea the 
whole realm of essence is not metaplv"aical in the aenae OUaon meant 
it to be. For San~ pure Being ia merely a condition 1n whose 
absence the rest of reall t7 will have no beiJ'W. tmderatood 1n this 
1Santqana, Skep1:1c1sm • • • , p. so. 2Ib1d. 
3schUpp, Paul A. (eel.), 'l'be Pbiloso~ of O.Orge Santayana (Evanston: 
The Library or Living PhilOsophers, 94o5, P• 5:36. 
4Santayana. Realms of B5M, P• .50. 
eenae, pure Bein& is oftlT the neceaal',1 concl1tion tor the pre8;m08'", 
ot be1nc. The import of thia distinction beoomes obvioua whe 
applla:l to the kind of entau..nt 'betwen each phU.oeopbw • a notion 
of Btdnc and the rest of real1t7. 
·When 01laoft eqe that Be1ng eotaU. the preac• or t.be rest 
ot Nality be does not mean mtaUIIent, in a logical .en .. nor tv' 
definition but 1n a caual s-... In other words the ooneequent 
"the presence of the rut ot reali..,... d.oee aot toUow h'Oa the 
anteoedant •Beine• b.r lotio al.cme or l:r t.be d.etinition or tenu 
but qy a oauaal. conneotion betVMft tba vbieb holcla desplte the 
logic aDd need• of men. Santqana IIIMllB no euob thiac tor the 
preHDOe of the reala ot ••aence impliea 'tbtt pruenoe ot pure 
n 
11e1ns bolde q. W1m.tAon. The"" la DO oaUAJ.IrelatloD -
th.. 1 
l 
Further axaa~nation· ot the wq in which Santqana bandl. .. 
the notion or pun BeiDa wUl make tble d1etincticm fticla"lt. Bach 
essence in the realm ot essence 1a what 1 t 1a tv vtrtue ot tbtt 
characterist1os whioh detlne it, jut aa water le wt.w qy virtue 
ot the cbanotenetioe whioh make it water an4 not Wine, aocla, 
milk. B.r reJHt.iDc all allen propert.1ee whloh ~debt ebanp ita 
natwe, it 1n tum dett.nee ita own. In this eenee, boiib identi\7 
anct ditterence are nppliecS to •oh eaeeoe aa well ae e&oh thine· 
But 1ft what eeae do .. Santqana aeen •nppltee". Hie 8tat.mt 
1e that, •Pure ·Beirtc nppllee, aa it were. the lopoal or aesthetic 
•tte wblcb all e8MI'l0ee haw 1n calam, and· wblob reduces thea 
I 
f 
• 
• 
• 
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to oomplr&ble modes on one plane of reali v. Pure Being is thus 
found in all essences s::>mewhat as light is in all colors or lite 
in all feell.ng or thought • • • nl Pure Being is mere]¥ the name 
tor the "logical and aesthetic matter" each essence baa. Even 
this phrase mq be further clarUied. 
The logical matter or an essence is the set or characterietioa 
which give a thing or eesence its identit7. The aesthetic •tter 
is that noticeable difference which a thing has from what it haa 
not. For th1nge to have 11\lCh distinguishable natures Sanwana 
11878 that, they must participate in P\11'"8 Betnc. His languace 
here is loose and ambiguous but when he deecribes what is JMant l:r 
•participating in pure Be1ng•2 it appears that 1 t is the act or 
reducing all things and. their relations to their intrinsic beinc, 
that ia, their essences.) The poaitiYe, intrina1c character ot 
each eaaence is its share or Being. The name tor this share or 
Being each essence has is Pure Being. So in a manner ot speaking 
b,y •participating in pure Being" the logical character or Naence 
ot a thing takes i te place in the Wini te realm or eaaenee. 4 
There is no rea.eon to think or pure Being ae haVing causal 
ettioaey or being other than as an euence. Pure Being is merel;r 
a name tor the tact that when things come into beinl they have an 
identity or tom which is !reed trom the etcuaibrancea ot ex1etence • .5 
1Ib1d., P• 4,5. 
-
2Ibid. , P• 49. 
-
4xbid • 
It pure Being baa no cbaraotenst.ioa which distinguish it to ~ 
with Sant.qana anticipates tbia objection with the nnark, •tt. 
would thel'etore N unleu and redundant hab1tual.l,y t.o apeak ot 
'pure. Seing•· it nothinc Wl'e meant Aft that Being is an eeeence.•l 
The difference Santapna 1'1Dds wozatb7 ot d.iet.inot.ion ie that Kch 
essence 1• or itaelt exol.usive ot ftller:f other. Pazoe Beine ie aot. 
excluaive or all other eeaences 1n this .... sense since ita 
nature 18 to be present ln all eeeenees • eoa.wrhat as apace la 1n 
. . 
au, pometrioal tt.cve•· •2 
). P.ropertiea of Bennae 
1. Identity of Eaaenoe 
In Section 1 pure BeiD& nppliecl the logical Mtter which 
all eaaenoea haw in 00111110n. 'thia lopoal at.ter Santapna detinee 
aa the identiv of an uaenoe. The identit,- or &1\1 tent or thine. 
ita essence, enaompaeeea ita entire definition, not, aa Santqana 
pointe out, the wol'd definition tm. •the character vbioh cl1et1npiabee 
it tree &1\Y other eaaenoe. ......, euenoe ia pertaotl1' individual. •3 
In the Bnclieh lanpace, the principle or identity is expne8ed 'tr 
the OQpula 11s'. fo asHI"\ 1n \he abstract, A ie A or IDN oonoretell' 
to sq ot a thine that it ia what it ie, is t.he tull M&niDc or the 
verb '1• • when identit:Y ia int.encled. This aaeer\ion ie reoogni tlon 
that a thing baa character but under no circnaetanoes doN it iJip'b' 
a deaaript.ion of this character or assert ita exlatenee.4 Tbe 
llbid. 
-
' 
Ibld., P• 18. 
-
~ •• P• SO. 
.. Santapna' "Some Meaninc• • 
P• 190. 
" • • • 
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copula •ia' denot.u, "this aJ.ncW.ar and exeluive identit¥ or •ch 
t.erm with itself •111 
S1noe idetit¥ 1.a the -~, inti.Jiate meaninc ot tbe voi'Cl • ia' 
Santa;ya.n& -aMa t.he t..ml •eseifta• dwtved fl'oJa. the .. J'OOt "to' 
deaipt.e' U\f 1.deal or toJ'Ml· natUN, al'l;Tthinc al_,.. neoe~ 
identical with itaelt.a2 The mere lJ.npiatio tact that 'ia' denot.ee 
the ident.iv ot a thing w1 th iteelt ia preoed.ed qy tbe ontolocical 
tact t.bat thin&• have character and theH cbaractera or eaMDOea 
rom the realm ot eaeenoe.3 The oopala •1a• ~ retlecta t.hia 
tact anci t.akea ita ai&D1tioaaoe trom it. 
The d.etenainate obaraoter ~ eaaence preclwtee the po8d.bU1\7 
or confusion or vac-ne•• in 'thia plane ot being. .Froa an onto-
lopcal point o£ vi.w, no eeMDce, twa or idea can ot itHlt be 
eaeent.1al.l3 w.,ue. !hie waa llllCle plain even in Chapter I wheft 
the datum present to intuition vaa 1aaecl1ate, infallible and without 
Ulbl.p1t7. Sant.qana bolda that1 
" .. • notJU.nc g1Yen in aenation or tlvnaght. ie in 
the leut -..- in 1taelt. Yapeneaa 1• an 
ad.Yet.lt.iows qualltq-. wh1ob a 'pYen appeuu.oe 
mq be aid to poaaeaa in r.:Lation to loll objeot. 
pr..-et1 to haft ot.ber d.etera1nat1ona: aa the ololld. 
in Hulet ie btlt a •cue camel or a Yap weaael., 
but lor the land.IO&pe painter a pertect.lT cletln!. te 
clo•b The vape ie •rel¥ the too Yra.pe tor eoae 
aeatae4 pu:I"PC)Ht tt4 
Thia ie not onq t.ru ot eeMftoea ciftft in aenaat.ion but t.boae ot 
tboqht as ..U. tor Sfmta.7ana beli..,..a, •there oan be no ~ation in 
1Ib1d. 
-
2tbid. , P• 191. 
3n».d.. p. 19). 4San~na. SkfEiioia • • , P• 95. 
the reala of eaaenoe ot mlataken 1dct1 t.;y. vagueneaa, ahitt.tneaa or 
self -coot.radiction. TheM do\abt.a arise in reapeat to natural 
exiatAnoea or the mean1na• or plU'pOMa of l1v1nc lllinda."l '1Wo 
points bear oonaidwation. Flrat, ~to both .. aencea given 
in eenaation and t.bo\ICbt ancl ev• eaeenoea not entertained at all, 
ia t.hell' d.etendnate cbaraot.er. Seoorld, the r•aon tor lack of 
d.etenlination or·~·· of eueoce 1e the aotivl.t.y of a U91Dc 
iiind" In,a woni, .,.. ~t.a:t.ton·ot the essence ia .-4e 'qv 
the ll1nd aa to the kind of eaHnOe bltore it. Aa in the craae of 
Hamlet'• clnd, a ~•otl¥ d.ei"inite character waa pnect.ed. bat 
. . 2 
upon interpretation it beoaM a vague caMl or a vac- .,.ael. 
But there ia no d.~, at l•at t.o Santayana that .,. detinlte 
cbaraoter waa pruentecl. In fa"- thia preaen.tat1on ot .,.. obuaG\er 
prececU.nc an interpretation ia the OODII1t.ion tor the interpreta'U.orl 
to ooour. IY8D tor 80 al.icht an interpnt.aUOD ot reooplsiDc a 
thine!! a tJWtc, the prreHDCe •t a Utinite eharaot.er la a neceu&17 
condl t.ion. 
ldenUty tbc 1a the prineipl.e of eaMnoe which paranteea 
clet.end.nat.e ebaract.er to all '\hi.nca, ideaa and teraa, poaaible or 
impoaaible, which~ be aid t.o haVe be1Dg. !bet.~' ldent11'q ia 
t.he1r beinc· It -bl•• t.n.. to be reoopiaed, reoa.Uecl or tor-
pttan. Santqana writ.. ot it •• a •qualitativ. id.eDt.it¥ &M.oii/ 
ea..bl .... to d1et1ncUiab 1 t, to atwv 1 t, ard to bolcl 1 t. taat. in 
lsantqana, l!!le of B!irw, P• 18. 
2Sant.ayana, Sk!R!:ig1• •• •• P• 95. 
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thought, so that I may eYentw.ll¥ fl"'UUIAt a def1n1 tion ot 1 t and. 
perhaps aaHrt or deny ita existence. nl Identity or d.etel'"ld.nate 
character is not onl,y the qualitative d.imension which enables ldnd 
to :recognize thine• !! things or as kinds or thincs but it error 
is to occur in recognition, eome definite charaot.er must precede 
the CTOneous Jmgment. 
ii. Universality of Essence 
The second propeJ"V or essence, its universality, -.y, at 
first blush, seem to contradict its individuality or identity. 
Santayana explains that "the inalienable individuality of each essence 
renders it un1 veraa.l; for being is perfectly self -contained and real 
only q.t virtue of its intrinsic character, it contains no reference 
to 8.1\Y setting in space and time. and stands in no adventitious 
relation to aeything. n2 The facts or nature are not thua "perle~ 
self-contained" but rather bound by external relations of space, 
time and substance. So bound, no 1nd1 vidual or particular is 
repeatable; each is lost to thought by its contingent natUI"e. But 
on the contrary instances are repeatable, for exat'llple, a particular 
tone of musie; the scyle of a suit or clothes or the llfNIOl"'J' or a 
stimulating experience. The condition for such repetition or recall 
is that the character of that tone, style or event be a univeral 
which is not bound the relations or existence. In a word, essence 
lSantayana, "Symbolic Knovlq.," Obiter SoriPH, p. 190. 
2 Santa_yana, Reallu ot @!i,nc. p. 18. 
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must be unaffected by the relations in which it is manitesteclj 1\ 
must be capa.ble of be1nc reproduced. At the same time it is onJ.y 
too obvious that thine• theaelves cannot be tho~ht and OOIIpllred. 
The principle of existence is chance and thinca are esHDthllT 
unkncwable unless plotted apinat a permanent fn.alework. Santqana • a 
notion of the realm of essence meets this nMCi as "the scale of 
measurement, tbe contimi= of variation" ap1nst whioh the novelU.. 
ot existence m:q be Cbmpared. and· related. . Ill short., lmowlqe ot 
thine• presupposes the permanance ot ita t.rma. 
'm condi tiona Dl\iat prevail then bet ore repetition in t.bovpt. 
can occur and both, in Santqana' a lllind, are ontolocical 1n c:U.ae.ion. 
First, the character of past experience IIU&t, in order to be :re..,_tecl, 
be freed of existential nlations and secondJ¥, once treed ot .xlat-
enoe JllWSt provide a penanent ~rk againat wbiah part1fNl.uo 111-
.etancea mrq be compared, relat.ecl and, hence, reoognl&ed and known. 
The un1 vereali ty ot eaaence ... ta both requir.s.nta. n.r.t, Ullll 
eaaance can be repeated either 1n nature or in thoupt ~. 
without detriment to its 1nd.lv1.4uallty. This w.a ade plain 1n 
S.ction 2 ot Chapter II when essences ww. consi~ed aa terll8 ~ 
dS.acolD"ee. Terms 1IIV8 the matential exjapl.ificationa ot eaeenoea. 
lllpol'tant here is that the ontolocical concl1Uon for nob •XW~>li­
tieation ia the univareallty ot eaacoe. Sa.ntqana reoopi.SN that, 
"Eftry eaatnee in ita own real1l ia jut aa central, jut aa nor.l, 
and jut aa complete aa &1\Y other: it ia thereton al.-.a jut 
aa open to ex-s>Ufioa'Uon or to tboucht, Without the a611t.1on or 
10. 
subtraction o£ one iota o£ its beinc •• 1 Seoondl7, inso.tar as an 
essence ia rep.atable in various amiteatationa, it automaUoal.q 
becomes a "scale of --.aur.ent" tor t.be eaeenoe naina a per. 
manent charact.er or !le!· When a thing 1e reoopiaed or thought 
about, it ie the .. aence which enables 1t to be recoanized anc1 
repeated in t.boucbt. It la ob'tioua]J' not the thing itself' whioh 
is repeated in thoupt.. "The eaaential un1 veraal.U.y of theee tol'IU 
/jaafllllcei} akea ~ tact 1nttota.r aa it uhibita th•, distinct and 
r 
lmowable: the universal and ~· indiVicl\al being ao tar troa oont.n.r:r 
that they are id..atical ... 2 J;he propel"ty ot uniYereallty oompl-..nta 
' 
that or 1ndiv14Wllity \ben 1D that 1t peraite essence as a quall-
tatiw d.illlena1on ot t.hinca \o be repeated in exletenoe and thua 
enabllnc the part. ot exia~ to be noopizecl u¥1 known. 
iii. Infinity ot Eaeenoe 
A tenet or Santayana's which necessitates the third property 
or essence, its infinity, 1a that existence ia both contingent and 
irrational. The inmed.iate question is ~ the properties or exist-
ence innuence the character ot a total.l¥ different realm of beincf 
The reason is that essences as pti.lll:)rdial forms o.t being are in· 
effectual, they have no power to control their own manifestation 
in existence.' histence, in thia case. is the external apttt 
and for essence to be exaaplitiecl in it, eaaence must be able to 
1 Santayana, tt.al.lu ot Bemc. P• 119. 
)Ibid .. , P• 20. 
·• . ~= .• 
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give torm to oaprici.oua •tt.r. low e:xietenoe is •vbo~ arbltrai7.J. 
and my take on aqy ebape or JIJOVe in ~ cSirecrtion. In add1tlon 
to one part not be1nc declucd.bl.e troll another.2 all put.a are irra-
tional in ~~ereq e.xiattnc. Caught up 1n ~c apace-tlae relations. 
exiat.enoe el\ldh identity. This .._,at firs\ .._ oontradlcto17 
aince it ia neceeur.v that all thine• be delecated SOM Obaraot.er 
upon COll21nc into exiat.oe. fhia apparent oontradiction ia reaolncl 
onq it eaaenoe1 are not oon81cl...S. as oonatltumt tart• oE thine•· 
Eannoe, like atter, ie a dimenalon ot ex:S.at.nt thins• rather than 
an inherent part. 'fhe dopatlo iftatinct ot &Dial taith l..U one 
to pta1t this tol'll or eeanoe aa 1ntrinl1o to the thiDc.-' But 
.. ._... oan n8Yer be an actual, part ot a nux. For eeeeraee to be 
the dimenaion ot torm vb1ell exi.t&\oe aniteat. at eftl"7 tva ea1e11ce 
mut be Wln1tA 1n variety. 4 ExS..it.enoe, beoauae ot ita lrfttional., 
unp:Ndictal:Wt prino1ple et obaDc•• d..anda an 1ntbd.te ftriety ot 
to1'118 with vhich it Jd&ht diaplq itaelt and be knowa. 
Santapna wom.ea that the Umitleea poeld.bU1:t.lea ot uacce 
be miaoonatrued and i4mtit1ed with the capao!:t\Y· ot m1Dd or nature 
to realise it. To idtntU) eaalllce with poaaible be1ngwoulcl oontine 
lta unlimited natur.. leltheJ> tva 'poaaibl.e' nor 1111poaaible' haft 
•proper app1.1aat1on 1ft the realm ot ..... , .._to taot.a 1n nature 
thtr are applicable cmq 1a nw ot tman ipon.noe or S•cSmUon."' 
8antapna reaeona tbat the 111Drd •poui'b\\1' uauallY atcnit1ea what 11 
lxbis!· 
'Iw,., P• 4). 
'nwl .. P• 21· 
~., P• 21.. 
~·• P• 21. 
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1Dacin&bl.e, 1n the sM'lse that, "the whole tuture and DIUoh ot the 
past, is called possible when 1Mc1nabl.e. nl But what o~ that part 
o~ the past and tuture Vbioh wre and still are um..gin&ble? 
The tendency here is to identity the un111ac1nabl.e with the 1mpoaa1bl.e. 
In efi'eot, Santqana says \hat to 11mit being to the possible ia 
to preclude the poa81bU1 't7 ot the impoaaible aa oonoei ved b¥ a 
human being. This JJ!i&bt be construed to mean that being oonta1na 
Mlt-oontrac:lictor,y .. Hncu like the reund. square and the son ot 
a ~woman. Santayana hol.cla sel.t-oontndiotion t.o be a product 
of the llind rather than eeeenoe. 
But how should arvtbinl preclude btt1ftc 1-.gined, 1t 
an imagination aroae capable or 1ac1n1nc it 1 The 
meaning can onq 'be that 11\Y own lMainatlon ln ao .. 
particular 1nstanoe, baa cot into a tancJ.e, and that 
1n speald.ne of a round square or or tr. eon or a 
't.rren woman I haft lost the mean1ng ~ ~qy tei"'U; 
and wbat I call an iaposslbUit.y is onl,y the sua-
peruse ot IV' own thought betw«l two possibilltiea. 
Nothing contradicts i taelt, not nen this state of 
oontuaion 1n DIY~· It is a pert'ectly 
pouible mx:ldl.e. 
The contusion as well aa the terM ~ the aonfua1on haft their 
1dent1 t.y. The aource ot the contusion is not the int:r1na1o nature 
of the eaaenoe but rat.bw the mind 1n clisoourn which trs. .. to 
1dent1f7 unidentifiable essences. Possible and impoeeible being 
then bas application onl3' 1n teru ot a disooursing .mind, not 
the realDa of neenoe. In tbe N&l.a ot essence the onl7 1.mposa1bUt:~ 
1s that one eseM'loe ehould. be another. 
llb1d. • P• 26. 
-
2zbid. , P• 2:'/. 
' .. "'~:. 
loft-uist.enoe is the 110st oonaequfttial PI'Oi*l'trl ot .. ..,..; 
ita ruif'loatiofta · peetnte ~llT flftf!7 ~ttoa 1n Santqana' • 
philoiiOPIV'. the •at illportant or these 1• the d1.-tlnct1en be.._ 
e..._ ._ u.iatenoe. San\lpD& ..._... tbla unorthodox proper\f 
and t:M •auine dlat.inet.lon between enenoe and UieUIMie v!.t.h two 
aet.hod.a. The tll"at vaa oonaidertd 1n the tirat chapter when Santa-
Tan& preae«t l'J1• me'tbodoleclcal akeptlel• beJond. th4J 11aita r.obed 
qy oonvent1ona1 crl.Uei .. o~ •wl41dce. tbl1lce the• he did not 
reet vlt.h ''beliewc11n1 taata nor~· tbr:nJcht to «d.et. l:Alt aovcbt 
a 081'ta1n\Y tOWld. onll' in the s...cllate c1 ftn boa which an.y ftt.cleMe 
tor Giattnoe 1• exol.Utled. Bv.t to ~tate t.bat «riat.Doe ta DOt. 
giftn in the t.ecliat.e dat• la not. the ext-.t ot Santapna '• 4ev1-.. 
Be OIU"J"lea thla notion twtber an4 ~netratu that •not.hiJ'C liven 
.n.u,• on the cro..S. tba.t pre .... to tntultlon la MithW the 
ruao.nar.r nor the auttlotent OODditton tor 1te ex:1.uao..1 The 
Hocmd pH'apftO'tlYe ~- whlcb · Sap.tqana d1st1np18hea eaecoe tl'Oal 
ex1at.enoe and ~tlr the non.-exlat.loe ot ea...- la the 
Mthod ot Btae \hilt "what eftr ia cU.~llle 1• .. parable. •2 
Sant...,ana later qual1Ciea tbia 1n •Apolopa Pro Vita s.• when be 
.,. •• •I do not 'MJUate the tw Jj,...ce and. ui.aTMIOeJ :t ~ 
dietl.npiab tha. •' . He the ·upl&W wtq' he oboo•• to d1atll'ap:1eb 
l.Sant.apna, f!!R!.1o1• •• •• P• 45• 
2Sant.~~pea, •ttiree Proota ot lalla," I!BI• in 2£1:t.ical !!!»•• P• 166. 
,SchUpp, Paul A. (ed.) • The Pld.lfftllht: o( 9!2£1! S!mW!nf, P• 525. 
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It. ia axioaat.ic tbat a t.b1ng can have no existence 
U it baa DO chan.otera ~ thinca with.!!!!! 
character can exiat. Yet existence involves change 
or the dane~ ot obancer thinp .._,be tranatol'Md, 
or in othv vol\ta tbe.Y mq drop one euenoe and pick 
up anotbel'. The lo.t. eaaeneea then ... to be 
actu•Jq ..,.rated li'OII uistenoe, like <lead leans 
!rom a tree; ~ thia too ia not acourate ••• 
notbinc can eYer. make existence aDd uaence oontin-
\11)\18 with mueic: like parallela such ol"dera ot 
being can MYV tlow into one &DOther .1 
The non-existence ot enence r.nrq in this caee appear as a 
consequence ot d1aUncuiah1n& wbat is ot a different order ot beinc 
or as in the caae or tbe dicrt.•. •nothing pftll exillta" the d1atinction 
betwec the two realma aq be the oon~ce of the dicta. Which 
ia a aoneequence.)et wh1oh ia lmimportant, that the,y aupport one 
another is proba¥J.T all Slmtqana expect.a. or con~ is the 
rae; that thia PJ!IO~ anpbatioally .diat1np18hea between t.beae 
two dimensions or beinc • existence &n4 eeeenee. At the II&M time 
non-existence lends oredibU.ity to the pro~ ot intlnitut:Se which 
Santqana belie'hs to bave an "audacioua aoua!• were it not tor the 
OOl"'llar.f that eaaencea do not exist. The point here ia that there 
is a natural t.a1deno,y to locate eaMI'loe 1n existence but pl"'pertiH 
auch as 1nt1n1:t.y • non-existence and etemitq tree one hom thia 
taaptation to }Wpoat.atize two ontoloc1cally different 41aen.ona 
~\, 
or thirtc•· It the reala ot essence waa realized in exi.etence, the 
extent ot enence would be Gepandent on the courM or nature. But 
essences are unatteoted q, tbe1.r realization or lack ot it. 2 It in 
~d. 
- -;: 
2Sa.ntayana• Realma of B!ipc. P• 22~' 
a bnothetioal oan, the entire ·nala ot •nnoe wae •-•p'Utlei"Uf"" 
axlstence, ea..noe .,uld .t.S.U be a radt~ d.itterent k1nd ot 
being. 
lven it ~ whole realm of ..aenoe · (aa 8p1no&a aa.-.4) 
wve Nallsed aomewheN at ao•tlM in \a. .Ut• ot 
nature, • ....,... woUld. r.a1n a d.Ut...-.nt and a mn-
exiat.t realat becaun the realisation ot --part 
could be Oftl¥ local and t.lpol"lll'7, -.t tor aU the 
rut. or ttae UTili 1n all 110rl.cla t.bat exolwltd. lt, •• 
taet would tade into the OOJ"''Up0nc1inc eMttnOe, an4 
would. r•aln oertabl and. !.lwv1tabl.e aa an e.._oe 
only, and aa a tact~· JlN8UIIIPtive.l 
The oonaequenoea ot l\YPOet&t1s1ftc eesenoe and enat-.oe then l• the 
ar\1tie1&l U&d.tat.ion 11DpoMC1 on t.he Wtnlte eoope ot betnc· Such 
1'\vpoatatiaation is neither acoidental nor theoNtlcal. 'tMt ~ t.ut.1Do-
t1ve ba\d.t o.t \be 1d.nd and. the source ot 80M 'tborn7 ep1atellol.Dc1oal 
pro~. 
Ot theae one ia the 1nue over priar.y aRC1 MOODdar,y qullt1• 
1n utter. 'fhe.ll\18b t'launted ~ 1a bow dlaaetrlcallT oppoaed. 
qual.lt1 .. or-~ ot .... web aa h&NneN to the touch ot IV tinpr 
and aottneaa to the J.101nt ot 19' tinpma.U oan both be attl"l\Mat.ed. to 
the .a.. portion ot the ·duk on which I work. Santqana ngNta 
it 1• a tal .. probla that •rests on the p.re.uaaptlon tl:lat t!».dda 
ot..,.. can 1M aM should 'be ~ltuenta ot t1w ob~ li1 natUT'e, 
·~ir..~~ 
or at lean ~ lllce ita aonatltucta.•2 Santqana bolde the 
opposed q\lallties to be neit.her ne14ent •1n the object nor the 
ol'pll ot ..,..,•3 bu\ rather relative to the orpna ot aenae IU'Id. 
l.Ibid.. • P• 23. 
':Ibid., P• 86. 
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mental aotiVit.y. The 'what• or ClU&liV cannot be a part of the 
'that' because it ia the civan of Sredbte experience and t.hia 
qy ciet1n1t1on ia non-aiat.ent. But. one ay aek, what of the •r•l' 
object, ia it not ~ ext.endecl and ia it not realq hal'd.T Santa-
7an& bolde tbat it la probabq both b\lt the oompoeitlon or •tter 
ia the bwd.neu or the pbyaioal aoiencea and not llpsycholocical 
anaqaie" or "logical d1acr1ainatlon ... 1 Santayana ol•tu "tbeae 
eo-oalled prtary q\l&l.ltiee are ~ tboae eeaenoea which custoa 
or acience continue• to uee in i te cleeor1ptiona or thine•· • So 
even the priary qualitiea gift little •re assurance than the 
HcODt.lal7· "'l'he prtary q\al.it.iea, taken p1otor1aJ.l¥, ~ jut 
aa ayabolio aa the IMtOODd.az7 onea, the •oondar;y, taken 1nd1•t1vel1', 
are just aa true aa the pl"ial7." Taken in thie aenae, ae belng 
relative to the orpna of lcnowlqe it a..u they would have ofll¥ 
little relnanoe to what tbllf profeaa to be indioatiw of. Santa-
7an& olaiu tham to be both rel.eftnt to the ll1nd and tbe object. 
TiuQr • • • report. ec.e part.ioular1:~ in the object 
vhioh, beinc relative to me, aT be of the hicheat. 
bl.pel1ance, UMt be1nc al.eo relative to 80Mt.b1Dc 1n 
the oona\it.~ton ot the object, mq be a val\able 1nd.1oat1~n of ita nature, like areenneaa 1n grapea.2 
But the 1"eU 1..- here .._. to be hidden. Santapna' a olailll is 
that. •nothinc given uiate• akea the pl"'bl• of priar'J' and eeoonda17 
qualltiea a peeudo probl• beoauae theae qualities are t.be given of 
thovcht or eenn experience and do not exiet. At the .. tiM 
the .. qualltiea are relative to both the object and the a1bd ~t 
1 Ibid., P• 82. ~ •• P• 87. 
caUNll7 dependent on neither beea\iae th~W' do nOt uiat. How t.h~ 
can a non-existent es~Mtnee be relative to 80Jiletbing ot wb1ch it is 
1ndepe.rdent t Santqana olailu both the mind and the emironaent 
determine the perception or the qual1 t.y but not oauall,y 1n t.he 
sense of caua1ne the quality t.o exist. 
The enYironment detend.nea the occaa1ons on 11h1ch 
intuitions ann. the psyche-t.M inhertttd organi-
zation ot the anillal-determinea their tol'lll.l 
The organism only enables the Jdnd to experi.,oe what the environ-
ment presents. 'the orpni• does not oauee the quality to appear 
nor does the quality exist existential]¥ 1n the CYironment. 
The contueion over this probl• ia due ·to the t.-actenqy men't1oned. 
earlier ot the mind to ic:lentit)r 1nstinot1T~ t.M quality With the 
tact ot the quality be1n& expc"ienoed or the essence with ite 1'elt 
existence. Santqana clar1t1ea tht.e with a ver.v pereepUTe dia-
tinction 'between the "biosrapbleal etatua• or an experienced e8Nilce 
and its aaa1aed. "pbynoal atatua.• 
Wb.eneTer a new eaaenoe 1e seen or conceivecl, an ev•t 
haa oOC\ll"red: there is a treeb natural moment 1n the 
natural world. But is that which baa coaa into exist-
ence the g1Ten eaeence itaelt? A~ce is an a.bi· 
guoue term. It fllq ..an a talae appeu'U\oe, oont.raated. 
with a true one, or it may aean an;y po81t1'ft preeenoe. 
The er-n at'ter SJnace ot a reel stamp la a talM &ppeal"-
ance since no green stamp exists; • • • It baa a b!o-
logical statue, heine part. of the experience ot a 
ptv-a1call.7 extant pereon, with pbTaiolocical oauea 
in that person; but the creen stamp 1taelt haa no 
p}\yaical status, 8\lCh ae the red stamp baa. tlm8 
c1Tennua does not confer exietenoe on that wbioh is 
g1ven.2 
~ •• P· ea. 
2SchUpp, Paul A.. ( ed.. ) • TP• Philoeomt ot Geo£1• Santg!na, p. 529· 
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About th• ~inlftc ~ ot essence, atemality, Santa-
yana has the 1-.at. to ...,.. It. ia UDllkel.T he oou14era 1 t leas 
lap)rtant than the otben lNt in deftninc tbA otben he 1Japlic1tq 
defines 1t; the eten.Ut¥ of eeHD• 1a a oounterpart. to 1nt1n1Q' 
and non.exS.atenoe. The ~tr ot. •aence 1• lle.t cletiMd -.a-
~i'Nl1', ~ in the hill ot MetE• Santa,'ana cletinee •t\e.t". ln 
tbis ~ the eternal obaJiaotw ot ea...- 1• defined q, what it 1s 
not. Tb.e me\hod ot \hie ..ction 1a to ooapue the t.aporal. oharactc' 
ot RttAr with the at411ponl. oharaoter ot Maenoe and~ dis-
tlnpith eaeence tJooa exs.n. .... 
S.tqana propo•• the t.Mptral character ot nbetanoe to be 
• bldlapaneablAJ· propes."\7. •a~ ~ .. 1• ~DCacecl 1n action, 
·. 
ud. aotion in'w.tlvea chartp, 't@!!t!M! &• 1n gux !P4 Ol!!!tltv.t.a 
a '@ltloal t!:!f. •1 Ai tiret tboucht. 1t llicht .._ that nb8tance 
ctuma•• 4Up1~ the et.mal ..._o.. wboae 1nel"t mtve rendera 
j 
·~ 1nef't.ct~l. ht · a~..,'«h. the dittuien of ~ •lenda 
.nst.eM to certain .temal ..... cu. and enabl" tn. to .rs.cure 
1n the tl.ux of tmm\a, • · u..·· condition tor cbanc• ia ~ eternity 
or ....... 
The eternal eel.t -ldMlti ty ot M"e17 eaaenoe 1a t.hertttore 
a eoad1 t.ion tor the poaaibili ty ot cbaneet an4 oaa-
pl.ete aa the real~~ ot eeaence 1e 1n ita ldeal. Win-
it;", and unaffect-ed there l:r the evolution or tb!Dc•• 
"t it 1a 1ntiatel3 1ntet'Wftn, tv 1ta ftlll1: etwnl.t¥. 
with tbia pei"Jle\ual mutation.2 
. ' ~.' . .. 
Matter ot course ia the ".nat and prlnciple ot change" 'tNt. chance 
ia alwqs trom one pa.rtiC\llar shape to 80Jile other and eternal 
essence is the oondition tor the idctit7 ot that shape WhCl the 
change ocoura.. In the BaM sense the pby'Bioal. tiM geneated. q, 
the nux or •tter is depend.nt on these triJ!ezod1al toi'U which are 
outside ~sical tiM iteelt. SantQ"ana u:rs that •obanps are 
perpltual.:cy' occurring in the relations or ita pu-ts• and it is 
the change tn>m one part to another which constitutea Ji\raica1 
time. But tor the tiMe to be noted ita teme IIUst be d.etinite 
and uncbancinc. The signitioanoe ot p}\ysical time oOCNrs 1n 
plotting its changes acainst a tramet«)rlc or eternal tenu vb1Gb 
do not enter the nux. 
Eternal f'rom is the condition tor chance and ti&e ba.t. the 
W8¥ 1n 'Which rorm is maniteated 1n the nux is pecul.iar to the 
contingent principle ot Mtt• and contrary to the neoea.S.ty ot 
essence. Santayana sq-a, "This cleaoent or 1ncamat1on ot nMncea 
cannot be their own doing, since all eaeences are inert and non-
existent ••• A world or aeoid.enta1 arbitrary ancl treaoberoua, 
tiret lMJda to the eternal a tauporal existence ancl a place in 
the nux. •1 laHnoea than being inert to not bring about their 
own ~Ntation. Matter does but without neoeea1t7• "WhatiJOIJYtll" 
happens ~ere. bappena there apontaneouaq, as it it had mmtr 
occurred before and would never occur apin ... 2 W1 thout. a1Do1Jtc 110:rda 
lSan~. Realme ot l!!1na• P• ?:16. 
2~., P• )Ol. 
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Santa.;vana Jal!;es 1t el•r that, "There 1• tha'l no nec•aait¥ in the 
relation between e&UM and et'f'eot, and no aasurance that law 1• 
constant.•1 Tber. ia no SWib 1111FAet7 ot ,., the M\lN bDlde 1n 
tho reala ot f88Cl•• It 1• cletendnate and ne••8U7 tbat •ch 
easena. b what it 1• apart. 1fta t.be oontS.ncen'- tlow ot trnnta 
vhich 'M¥ or -r not Jllanif'ert it. 
~·• P• 303. 
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1. Critical Eval.•tion 
The brunt ot this ori t1c1• ot Santqana • a doctr1ne ot 
essence is d1rectecl on \be d1etinot1on between essence and existenoe 
and ita iapl.1cat1ona. In •Apolepa Pro M.-1te S.., • Santqana 
reaark8 that nen betore bla phUo•Ji\T •tured, Joaiah Royce 
o'baerftd that \be list ot Sant.qana • a tbcnJpt was •the a.parat.ion 
ot eaaeoce trom exS.atenoe. •1 That SaMapna bad 1004 :re&80D to 
110 d1at1Dau111h eHmoe troa ex1atenoe waa mctet in the pnoecS1nc 
chapters. ht at the .. t.1ll8 obt'iou eoaplSoat.ioDe emanate troa 
tbia d1at1notion. It would be no Villleratat.et to eq that thia 
di8tinc\1on is the AobUles' heel ot Santapna • a pbil.c;aopby. The 
juet.U'ioation tor t.hia 41atinct1on and. ita oonaequenoe~J 1n Santa-
yana' a tneor.r ot knowl.eclge and t.Aeo17 ot being is t.be aubjeot •tt.r 
ot t.hia oritit!l•· 
1. Het.hodolopoal Skept.ioia. 
In the Introduction to thia tbeels the oplblon •• adYaneecl 
that NMftoe, as a priaord1al torm of beinc. vaa held. 'tv' SaDtqana 
to be related to or a OOI'lMC'l\I8RC8 of his ft41aal ak•icia. In 
~ eurae ot &Nbaequent inveetigatioD evidence 8\lbatantiated thia. 
It became plain that Santapna intended hie akepticie to 1"ttYeal 
eaaence aa the •1a11t reaidU\11 of akeptici• aD4 ~sia.•2 hrther 
1 schUpp, The f!'!Q0!2R of OftEn Santgana. P• 497. 
2Ib1d.' P• 28. 
-
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felt. tbat. •to OODe1der an •acoe S.a, ~a eplrltua1 poiat o~ 
view, to enlarp aoqalfttanee WS.th tru beirla ••• a~· 
WS.tb Naence IWldere lt Wal11ble, vhil.at. the loeical. aDd au\hetio 
ldeall'Q' ot ita object ~era ~ obJect ~ •• 1 It appeara 
then that the 1.-n Santqu.a upeot.a of hie ~Jilt.aal akept1-
o1• ia that S.t will NYta1 eaMDOe •• an ept~oal .._aiV 
and at the a:ust a ~1 tOI'Il of be1nc~ :ta.p; \Mbt Uld Mlmits 
wre Q\»Ucl aa objeoUnc w thia ~ rel.at~n betweft b1a 
Mt.bedolo«ioal. akePtlOS.• and ODtolGcT. 8\erlJ.nc l'..ulpNGht. oon.. 
eiclen tbat SaDt.Q'ana'a ~Oi• •nata S.ta ~t em a ..ta-
plv'aioal to!£ de fo£!!•"2 
In tbla reapeet (lt 1n ne o~) it na.blea Deeoart.u1 
~!!· SkepU.oia 1D l:Dt.h Deaeartea aid 
1a a -'badoleltOIJ. dwloe ~. lft · . 
etteat 1t aot 1n\eat,. tMll' ....._. an ~' 
1nto ....... ~ aeqlil, ........ 1n tbe aubeequent '·taftNd. 
metapqraioal clootr1ne•·' 
The ·truth ot thia obaet•watlcm re.t.a of 00\JI"R on the nat.ure ot the 
relation betwee the ooncluion of Suatqana • a aJI'IUMII\ and the 
PJ'Mi•• which 1niroduee it. !he ajor «mol.ulon of Sant.Qana • • 
akeptioi• 1e tbat •notb1nc ci'Nrl exine.• t.b1a .ta~ 1a 
.._cU.oall¥ different. 1n klDcl f'l"ooll one ot ~· ...-.- wblab lat.Joo-
cluee u., .. ~, that "exi.tenM la not pwn 1n ~tloe." Tbe, 
latter 8\a.t-.nt ia aa eptate~~~Dlosioal. .....,uon 'Wb.Ue the toNeP 
lSarltqaDa, l§otioi• •• :i P• 75. 
2Scbilpp. U\! fbUo!Op!JY tl Qemse Santa..yare, P• 122. 
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ia ~sical. !hie crltique q\188tliona tbe J.ecitl-.er ot 1DterTlrac 
fztoa ep18t.emolocical preai .. a t.o ~&deal ooncluiona. '!be 
aetho4 ia to inapec\ ._, ~· t-oru both of whieh are intro-
duced qy the prwd.M •extat.eno. ia ,not. clven 1n 1nt\d.Uon• and. 
naadne their d1.tt.-enoe8. 
The tirat arpraent pattern auaeeted 1n QJ&pter I •• the 
corrnnt.1onal tool of tbe altepUo _. 1fhen ~ 'tiiaa lrnf'v.tabl.e. 
Tbia plttern ubiblta COOd l"8&aon te UI\Y Obulp, tM ..U, ...,1'7 
and the realit,- of all taot.a. The ~t does ae l:r at~ 
the I!Dde ot lnterence tbro\llb which ftab lmDvl.edp 1a zw.checl. In 
Slmtqana' a •• an mtin olaaa of. ~et• 1a dOul:it.ed l:r at.taekinl 
aa 1llept.iate the Werenoe acle troa the 1ntult.1on ot a d.atua 
or appearance to the en~ ot the appeuanoe. lD other 110..U, 
1t 1e U1ecit.1ate to inter ·t.he tao.t: ot appMnnoe tna the appear-
ance. 1'h1a tollA>we beoaue ot the~ s.ntqana Oboo•• to CIOilCeln 
intuition. It la 1\Wh t.bat 1n a .,._,t ot int~tion wbell the (. ~ 
skeptic 8Uapenda ~t. uiatenoe 1a not. given 1n the ·~~ . 
Dur1nc that particular ...-nt of 1ntu1tlon the akept1c' • :J4?gio 
1a Walli'ble. Hla dcaial ot the aelt'a exlat~. obaDc•· ~17 
and other tact. ia aeoure becrawse b1e det1n1t1on pred.t.dea 1 t ·!Jwl 
belnc otherwS.... ht 1n the lone run the ek8pt1o' • atat...rt.a are 
tal.ae and pronn false- the ftJ!'I' tact that hie &JWUI 111t. J'*'ft0888 
attil'lu bia u.iatence and all el:ae that. he deDi... In othw 'II'CmU, 
t.bia denial ot facta 18 ~ a J)NYiaional cleolal vit.h t.he pro.. 
v181.on beinc that the c1en1al holds onlJ" w1 thin the •••t. ot 1ntui tlon. 
The pl'QYla""nal nat"" ot the ararcaent liTes turi.her 1ntor- · 
•tion about the praaiae "eXS.etenoe ia not liven 1n intuition." It 
was pointed out that the argument bolda 4ur1rag t.N JJIOJIM!mt of intui-
tion. This ia so beoaun or an epiat.....,locical d.eo1aion aa to the 
nature or intul tion. In o:t;.her \IIDrda Santqana 10 4etl.nea intuition 
auch that exiatcoe can 118981' appear wl:tbin it. He does eo 'tr 
defining exiat.enoe h'om the point or View or knowledge. Santayana 
eaya, "I therefore propose to v.ae the word exist_.. ••• to 
dest.cnate not data ot lnttd.U~n btlt facta or ..,_.t• believed to 
occur 1n nature. "l Again f'Z"'Ol the point ot View of knowledge, 
"Existences, than, ••• an tacta or .,.nta a.t'tiraed., not 1JacN 
seen or toptca mereq cterta1nec1.•2 Acool'd1nc to tbaae det1nl.t1ona 
it is eYident that "ex1atence oan n.,... be given .in lntu1Uon .. "' 
It we depend ct~ em the premlMa tor OW' knowledge ot the 
ooncl.uaion and intuition tv d.et1nit1on excludea existence in the 
pr.Uae, it ia 1apoaat.bl.e to pt. extatence into tbe ooncluaion. 
Thia is all the alcept.S.c is tr.Y1Dc to point out. 
The next pbaae of Santapna'a arc-ant ia ~a d1ttererrt. 
eort. From tbe prad.ae tbat. exiatcoe ia DOt given in intld.t1on 
Sant81Yana ..,._.,,.twthW tlat. "the datum e:xieta t.. unaeraninc and 
it insisted llpOQ is talH. _,. Hen the ~ becomee ambicuoua 
it not incorrect. It lurprecbt. 1• eorreot. tba t Sentqana • a akept.1-
c1sm is a Mtap)vaical. tour de terce. it begins a\ tbla point. The 
lSantayana, SkeJ?Uciem ••• , P• 47. 
'n,s.d. 
2~ •• P• 48. 
4xbs.d.. p. 45. 
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aabS.cuiv ia preect beoauM Santqana n~ ~ t1x tbe ~t 
or the poaaible aaaertion tbat t.be datUIR 2.2!! exiat. For ex&~~ple, 
it in a moment or intuition I waa to look tor mctenoe ot the datum•a 
existence, mst aa~ I would tind none and ineiatinc that the 
eviclence ia liven the propoaitlon 'the datWt exiata' would be tal.ae. 
But merel1' the laok ot e\'idence at tbat ...-at ot intuition ia no 
assurance that it doea not mat. At the next .._t I ~aq aaHI"t 
ita existence with equal.lJ' u INCh aaauranoe aa Santq&Da .pretenda 
about ita non-existence. Thia then 1a no proot that eaMftCea do 
DOt exilt. 
One mlght grant .Santapna'a ~··that existence ia not 
giYen 1n 1nt.uit1on whUe 11hat ia, 1a an eaMDGe, but .troa th1a it 
does not tollow that eaaenoea do not exiat. S\1rel¥ SantQ'ana 
int..nd.a to demonatrat.e DDre than tbat existence ia not pftft in 
intuition. Hie arc-eot 1a that the liven 1• n~ non-
exiatent. San\qana dou not u-.rt. this upl1ei~ but it ia 
implicit in his 81"CUJB8Dt \hat •noth1.nc p:ven exleta• ia not~ 
a biological. raot which admits ot venttoats..n. Wbat Sa.ntqana 
arpea ia n::>t onJJ' that it ia a ptweioal Sapoaaibillq tor exiatcoe 
to be ctven 1n intuition bu.t that th1a aomebow inmvea a logical 
illlpoasibility. lo tact.\Jal eY1denoe oan be inYetgbed. ~or or ap.in.IJt. 
beoauee aa Santqana al.Nad,y ~et:rat.ed that preaeoe to intuition 
ia neither tbe neoeua.r,y nor the nttioient oond.S.tloll tor 1ta . 
axiatenoe. It the preaenoe or 80Mthinc is aot teat.i:aHW tor ita 
existence than 'What 1at San'tqarla1a aJ'I\IIHllt baa :preeludecl the 
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po•ibillv ot faot.ua.J. ev14ence. Wbat San~ arpes u that 
it 1a a loc1cal irl1poaa1.bU1q tor a thing to be liven 1n 1ntu1tioo 
and exist. The ClOnoluaion "nothinc: e1 ven exists" tolloWB from tw 
praaisea: tiret, that intuition 18 the onlT act.1v1ty 1n which 
essences ar. present.ed d1reetl7 to a1ncl and that onq eaaencu are 
, 110 preamted. 'l'h1a toll.eva from Santqan.a • s uae of t.h• term intui-
tion which be baa pr.-pted lor'~;~ial aet1v1~ 1n which 
eaaencee are presented to the J111.a4.1 ~, eaaeocee are non-
existent. Evidence tor·tbie 11 oE a neptive aort. Since existence 
' 
is not given 1n 1ntu.ttl.on allli uaencea an, Santqana. baa reason to 
think tbat e.sccea are non.exl~. What ie .,re m.nc. the 
presen<:e or eaeenoe ie neither tae neeeaaar.y nor the .ntt1c1«nt 
condition £or ~lr exiateno., it ia atill·mre unU.k~ that tbe.Y 
exS.st. Given tbue two pr:wd..sea, that only 1n intui.tion are eaeenou 
prescted to the m1n.cl arw:i that uaeneea are non-exiat4nt it "'uld 
follow of logical neceaaity' that, l\Otbine given exiete. The rea.aon1rc, 
however, goes like this t It onlJ" eaMDces are c1 VM in experience 
and essences do not exS.at., then nothing g1 vEla exists. 
U Santayana dou J»t fl.I'IUe tbat 1n a4'9an~ tbe dictum 
"nothing given uiats" it is a locical1mposs1bU1ty for a thing to 
be given 1n illt\tltion and exist, then what I bave ad:nneec.t here 
is incorrect. Be apeoitiaal.J¥ eqa tbougb that be dcHta not mean 
to be~ provisional but that ita just oonclusione vUlJWDain 
tixed.. 'rbie atill ie no indication that he bolde "Mt.hinc ginn 
existe• to be J.ocically ft904UIA.t7• San~ana mq -~ be dallon-
etrating tbat there 1e no .rtdenoe to the cont.rar.r that eaeenoee 
exiat. Tbla I gran is all he expl.lcitly statee but it be ftal.l¥ 
intended hie ont.oloQ' to be cMpenclent on his radical skeptici• 
the it BMU MOM88J7 tbat the relation be a lOgical one ot the 
sort juat. 4e•metn:t«l. It 1 t is aeant to be a JAcioal relation 
and that ie 'the aaiQip'iiotl ot tb1s paper then juet what has he 
aoooapliahacU lot 'ft'l:7 IIIUOh at leaet from the point ot viw ot 
saying mre in the oonclue1on tban is al:ready contained. in the pr.Un 
of hie ~. The tnt.h of the oonolueion is aeNJ¥ a eoe.aqunot 
ot the lqioal taet tbat it OlllT .-.noaa are giv.a in 1ntU1t1oll 
and tn..Y de not ext-at tben ~t.hinc eo ctvea ext.t.a. The non..exletenoe 
ot euenoee S.. the oonditt.qa tor tbe aonclWtion be1nc aaaarted in 
t)le ti:rat pl&oe. This ia not too tndttul. an •ra-ent• Ita trult-
tulneas ia a . oons~ ot ltf being true and this aa Sant.Qana ia 
aware earmot. .. be decW..ed. .-pirical.ll'. 
U.. Tbeo17 of Knowledge 
One of tM oonaequeftoee. ot ~ta.Jana' e 41st1noUon between 
essen.- aNl ..O.atence is that all~ expert.eoe 1• of J.ocical 
ee..oee nthe:r than .neteat thine•• It exclw:iee a,. ponibilit¥ 
ot existents being expe:rieced i.JIIIIed1atel1' as might happen 1t I 
were to touch a bot stove or taate a 80Uf' apple. In bot.h .... 
Sant.qana hol.da that what. I.e giftft directg t.n experience is the 
esnnoe ot the hot teel.t.nc or tbe sour taste but u- object 1 tael.t 
88. 
ia not a tart ot the t.peecl¥!p experlenot. The entire oontent ot 
experience ia a aucoeuion of l.oclcal eaaencea vhich wen when 
true of the thing tbtrT a.plif1 rwain a different order ot being. 
Nothing elaa ia ..,... ~ presented in experl.enoe. Srard 
B1aruibal"d critioisea this poaition on the grounds .that Santqana 
contueaa hia wse of the tenu 'exlatcoa• and 'exiatent• .1 sterling 
Lamprecht takH anot~ point or n.ev and eqa tbat Saat.Q'ana 
erron~ holds intuition to be tiwt only act.1Yit.y 1n llhiob exper-
ience oan occur. 2 
Jlov Bl.anabud and, I tapne, Lunpracht too, ap"M vS.tb 
Santa.vana that ~· actual exiat.ence of an object cannot ptor.S.oallT 
be inolw!ed in tboucht or experience. Blanabud ~· "ha.Yinc 
cr&ntecl that ve cannot intuit exlneoee, we tt.nd ouraelwa called 
to 'bal.S..V.. tbat w cannot intuit aistenta. But thia ia a total]¥ 
different pn>poait1on.•3 Blanahal'd'a point. hare ia that alt.bouch 
exiatenoe ia not given 1n intuition, obaraeter ia aDd t.bat U 
obal"actera experi•oed. an not exill\ent obaftet.ra then Blanahar4 
liiOndera just what are. In the .... ft1n tampreebt IJQ'a, "Bxpa.rience 
.,._.to -n:r or ua to give imediatell' certain ex1a~ial. taota • .4 
I.utpreoht Mkea uae ot a distinction ot Whitehead's ~ •a 
part.iC\llar sort or oolor" and •a part.t.cular patch or blue. • 
lslanebard, Brand, Paa!tture of ;?!4J!t• Vol. I. (tcaloau Oeorce 
Allen & Omrln, Um1 , 195§), P• • 
~t, "Santqana, Then and low,• P• !),S. 
'sl.anahard, The Nature o~ Tboycht. p. 4)9. 
~echt, "Santayana, 'J.'b.n and. low," P• .S)S. 
' ' 
To I.aapreobt the puti,ular patch ot blue 1• •• SMct!Sat.,. pz8H11t 
aa t.luJ .!2£1 ot blM, the ...... b1•.2 
Wbet.ber the ob3eot1oa 1.8 \bat of 8l.aftahal'd, that the obaraoter 
ot eaMnoe c1wn in 1nttd.t1on ia a put. or vbole or the a1et.ent, 
or that ot I.urpreobt, that. ather exiatenta are ciYeD 1n intu1t.ion, 
or that int\U.Uorl 18 not the OftlT aoU.Yl\)r in 11M.oh . .,.n•ae 
can ocoua-, both 8INe tat diHot tarpel!l-. 1• not .,1e17 or 
losioal eaMnOM but. ot ~-. 
Blanllba.J."li, deaplte tbia objeet.:1eft, l..U the 4oc\rlae ot 
eaaenoe 1• bett.w deelcDtd to bUdl.e ~ona ot tbe •rt jUt 
~Mnt1on«l where ........ are··r.r•••tecl ~ aad explicit~• 
rather t.baft 1n t.bcn~pt. B~'• ptlnt ia that aooosrdinc to 
80mect \be ori.tioal. nallate ·~ ftt an objeot, 1lke peroel'Yinc 
u., J.apllN that.,.. or allot S.t.a cb&ftat.ere ue d.1Nct3¥ pre-
Milteci. •:S '1'be q1aHUan poNd. b wbether 1n rapid reacl1nc or con .. 
venatiorl that. a •conore'k •ftctw, or toae piece ot t.bla baa been. 
dlreotl.r Pr-at.ect to avll1ft4t•4 ~ ia r»t Vithou\ an an..,.. 
t-o thia pnbl•· 1'boueht. o\wlouJ¥ \ane pl.&oe w1tbo11t .Ubtg to 
alncl the entire ohaftoter ot the Wna tbolJCht. about. the Nlati.on 
1~.. P· 149. 2DM·· P. s,e. 
)al.an*m:l, !h! lature or .the!PL p •. ~1. 
~. 
! 
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ot intent makes tb1s possible wb.en the terma or cliacourae refer 
to .. .eencea or facts without th• being present. This referential 
relation of term to usance or 1'acta not gi'len to intuition ie a 
meaning nlaUon. But tor terM to have .-ntng this relation need 
not occur each time a term is D*mt.. In rap14,J!"ttld1.nc, tor GUJple, 
the terms anterta.1ned aU have aipitlaation ineota.r aa t.h• tnt.ead 
an easence. The zoeader need not neoN~ be oc:mniou ot tbe 
relation or intent 'bu.t it IIU8t have existed onoe tor ·tbe term to b&ve 
arr:1 meaning at all. Bl.anehaM ol.a1ma dire oona~s for 03 S\lCia 
theory or knowledge. 
It in ._. oaaee w ~ think et objeeta, and thS.nk: 
truq, 111~ inWltina their nature, wb7 abo\1lcl 
this be neoeasa17 1n &1\Yt It a tal.lJna short l:r 
d.1reet apprehenalon ot tbe nature ot wbat is kQown 
is fatal to lmoWledp ~. how can it be con-
sistent With knowleclp heroe'f It I can t.b1nk ot a 
th1nl t.ruq tbovp ita eascoe does aot appear 1n 
IV content ot ~~. bow can tn.t.h M. 1clent.it.T ~ _, 
eaeence, ~ween ftC1 content aM. U. -th:lnga obaracterr-
Blanshard's cnticia is etteotiw onl3 it tho~ mut. intuit 
aome or all ot ea.-ce tho\llht abcNt.. ht tb18 1a not the caae 
with Santa_yana' a position. ~ • a reaaon tor atntaiiWic that 
in eome aa•• we can think of objeets ld..tbo\tt intuiting their 
eaaencee, is, not beoau.ee lt ia llllpGssibla to 1ntu1 t their eseence 
but because once eignit1aat1on between tem and eaaenoe or object. 
baa been eetabl:tshed the twa CU'J'ies mean1Dg vithoa npea.Unc the 
relation or int.ant. Blanehard ..... to recognise this btlt t.hen 
1&nores it;,:in the nbMquent diaouasion. What is DeoeaA17' in a 
ltb1c1. • P• 442. 
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aean1nc relation 1a not that the •• .._ bt ~ apprehendad, 
but tbat lt be capable ot 41reot a~alon •. It, boveYer, the 
other orl.tioal realiata are OOJ'NOt and. d.lrect a~alon 1IIUt. 
be prNa'lt in tboucbt t.he &ntqua•a po81t1on 1a 1na4eqate &ft4 
Blanel.lard • e· oriticia boi.da. 
:I.U. Theory ot Be!J)c 
In abapter III eaMneee Wl"e ~ aa inert., inaDS.ate 
and lnetteot\lal th•s• vlthout oontrol over the1r own •nltutatton 
or the aotiv1t.Y ot. ule~t tbtnc•· .... ~ t.bia iJ)ert an4 SnanS.._ 
reala ot tom Santqara jwcapoaea ·an ani.ma\6 etteot.-.1 nala ot 
utter to account tor t.b4t aoUvtt)r or tMng8. Jut the t:No realu 
run paral.l.el.; t.MF .ft8ftr t.a\w&ot.. laeenoe and •t'ter are .cU..t.lDcrt 
1n ldnd., t.M toi"Mr 'be1nl inert. and be.tf'eot\1al and tu latter aoUw 
UJ4 ettloao.t.oua. Ill abon, naitw a'ld..atence nor eaaenoe oaue tbe 
other to be. Baeenoe ia llD a dog' a ntleottcm 1n the •ter; .......,. 
tiM he J.eana oltt. OVW the ll&ter t.he nfleot.1on 18 tbere, ~ he 
do" mt oaue it to be thwe nor oould he oauae 1t to w.nleh 1t 
he eo duirecl. lt 18 tben 4eap1\e td,a. 1he iap.U.oattoa her• 1a 
that ebaracter 1a irl"ttl.ftant with nsard to aotint.T. It. MS.thtd" 
cauu 1»7 le callHCl. 
There la coo4 reaaon to the oon't.tU7 to bol4 tbat. ....... 
haw cauaal ettloacv 1n tlw ._.. ot belnc 1ntecral to oaUM. 
lome ~·tor thie nppoaltioft b the ottftoua ptv'~oal. 
ftllct10U to at1DJG11 like .tire or a hit on the hea4 anclldaa 
vhich DOtivate crime or lnap1re art. SairtapDa • 8 Ylw 1a that in 
.:_,, 
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both tbeee 1nstanoee what le uperian.cecl is the ohaftot.- or euenoe 
of an event rather than ita pb.ya1cal at1mul1. The diatlnct~n here 
t.nvolvu two distinct. taotora operative 1n an expviential event. 
The first is the eontent of an experience which 1n this oase 1a 
'the "what" or obaracter of tn. event, while the eeoond is the 
occurrence or •that" ot \be 4mmt itself. low the actual .tliMU. 
or the entertaining of the idea 1• an existential fm!lllt and what 
causes the nbeequent bebavtor 1a ttM event and. not the eesenoe. 
It is evident that tor Sant.tpna the caue or an u:perience Jl1\18t be 
distinguished trom wbat 1• experienced, reallsed or lcr1o1tn• Bl.a.nabu4 
holds this to be inadequate beaue "an ev.:rt. is al_,.a oo.po\1ftel; 
it is not an ocourroenoe in which not.hina oooure; it is al.wqe an 
occurrence g! SOIIIethinc· ADd E!! oocura ia ae brportant to the 
eequel as the OCOUI"f"CGe ot this lwha\'. wl It this 18 deniecl 
Blanahard claillla •the onlJ' altemat1ft ia to introduce neva of' 
causality and 11\fercoe vblah recluoe both to oompl.ete QOntinpnqy. •2 
This ot course is vbat Santapna baa dOfte blrt. the prioe for bol.cl1nc 
oonsietent.J.¥ to th1s Yiew is hiab· 
A closer look at how existence takes on tom or oban.crt.er 
wUl make this clear. ~ eaHnOU become involvecl 1n uinential 
relationa, that 18, when the;v are ~l.U'1ed., th4V are ao, not qy 
their own ettert, wt as we •w, b.r an active orcani• or the 
course ot nature. Only existence 1a active and ett1cac1oua and tor 
9). 
whatever shape it happens to take eeaance 1II\1Bt provide the .f'orm or 
character. Sut there is no neceuity withil) na.ture tbat determinee 
it to take one form rather than another nor to repeat a tom tba:t 
baa been habitually repeated in the past. Existence ~ d.efinit.ion 
is thorough17 contingent. •There ia no necessity 1n the relation 
between oawse and effect, and no assurance that law is constant. •l 
Blanahard thinks this skepticism of causality is of the profoundeet 
order. 
He~ not cmJ¥ <*4•• all knowle6ge that evaat 
A. lllU8t produoe eftnt B. but bolda that no coaoeiftble 
extenaion or lcnow'l.edce eou1d ehow that the .cbara,oter 
ot A hacl ~ to do with t.be production ot B. 
F()r characters an ~ inert easenoea.2 
The point here is that it one ia to define eascaoee aa inert, non-
existent and. ineffectllal., t.bia is the only concluaion that can be 
drawn. But I~ does not ~..,. ~ can hold to this 
consiaten~. 
He [lantqani] . a~s :r-.d7 ·to aooept the .ax:lm that 
what baa bappenecl wUl happen ap'n •wb....,.. Bimil•• ·. · 
elements &A 1n the eaae rel.a'tio~,. tboucb\add1rc . 
tbat this ia 'oal¥ a poetula~, which contiripn't, 
8\lbatantial and oricinal taet.a aq at an,y point. 418-
al.l.ov'. So tar aa w know, boW8"'ffl", tbtJ7 haw DOt. 
disallowed it ,..t, and contlrmed co!loomitanoe with 
no connection is Vffi!T like miracle • .., 
Other 1nd1cation• tbat Santayana walks a crQOked path with 
reprd to his cl1at1notion between eaunce aDd exiat..nee an the 
inft&ncea 1n whloh he uses l.anglaace 1n such a way t.hat matt.r ancl 
ltbid., P• '0). 
-
2slanahard, The Nature ot Tb&p&ht, p. 4).5. 
~. 
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uacoe seea to be ident.ttied. I~ oites tbrH example8; • · 
1n parttcul.ar, in vhlcb lu1iqafta · . ._ to unquiah his poaltton. 
~ eq-a, •ror tbe mat.enal ..... ot u;vtblnc • • • ia a 
'" !'l-
cert&1n quantit.,- ot •ttw ~ !'!?t!E !Szt~ f!m!• al or •t,be 
atructun and mo~t ot the nbPanO. at huc1 under \bon ..:t.wlal 
circnaatanoea•2 an4 .. Bl.a.neM1"d OOAttnUH, •tn expotmdtoc hie na't\lralJal 
be all~Q"e p:ro...C. aa 1t YU'laUon~t ~ cur mind or· 'pqobe• nre 
1nducec! b.r the cbaftc1nc obal'aoter ot our bfts.n..•' Then 1n&lt.anoea 
. ,~. 
_. bt •r• Pl'Obleu ot 'febll,~cm llbiob Ul'tdo~ Santa• 
. . 
;yana could ~ enn to Jl..anehard • s atlataot1on bat. tbel' de 
1nd1eate an lna\S.notin. t.denc.r to 1~\U)' .-...nee ... ext ...... 
. ,' ' . . 
In an.v •• ~ 1a d.nven to an ~ ot skeptl.oi• Ind. the 
onlJ' thing that ...,... h1ll troa the jaw ot a tborovch coin& ektlptl-
ctm 1• an1lal taitb. The~ 1•• What .upporte any 1dDd .o£ 
.t'alth 1n a IJ,Yetem 8\lOh aa \bla. It ,.... tbat faith 1n tb1a NnM 
nn be total.l.N irrational and. lt 1a illticult eno\llhtto ban faith 
1n eo called reaeona'ble tbinC• IIUOb lua the unreuona~ aa veU 
a4Yanoed by ~. 
A. hrt.her probl.• ant\ eloeell" Nl.a\84 to tbat ot oauaaUt.Y 
ia that ot 1Dtenace. w_._. -., al• lMt renclwecl ~ 
it ea.-eea are not a part ot e:x:le'tcoe, that 1a, lt ftl.R«lt. 
ehan.cttr.r ot OM eort ia not tbe ..-ret. tv lnt411'1'1.nc ·the exS.Rent 
l Sa.ntqu\a, Rftl• ot I!J.M. p. 194• 
~-· p. 195· 
'al&ncbar4, Jh! late ot thgycht, P• 436. 
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cbal"a.ote' of another 80J"t. Thle 1a preoi~ t.be oa" vlth Santa-
yana tor tbe ...... at one maaet \a clear~ indeperldeot o:t tbe 
8\lCOfNdinc Heenoe. Wbat ·~• tor the mov.at~nt ot thought ie 
..... animal u . .r. ot the pe.yobe. ' In .o\Mr WOJ"da t.hfJl pande ot ......... 
whether dlaordezo)7 or in tn. rom ot a d~uctive pattern ie ptorsl-
cal.l)r cawted at..,.,. pbuft.l w...ne. pat'Utma are~ to 
the aoc1d.ental ba'bl te or the :PaYohe and reYeal no neceaaary stru.ot.ure 
ot tb111p. The ~ aonatl-d.nt 1e tapulee and. $1\stino\,- !lanabard 
subatantiatee this with a ~ ot ret..-.n.ou. 
the S.nt.uttlon ot ~ etnMihoe to be thought ot ~ 
8VCl the ..Otrt. obrtoue w_.... or d~, JAalt. 
be 1.-reted \'fr, ta• ~t or living cU.aocnar•· 
and q, the ~ of IIQIM anial Ute. · 
01aleot1o:. tMn. Wb1le o.teil8i'bl3' tollolrlnc 1dM1 
illpl.ioatlou -. • • ~ ~ a •twlal. 
lite.J 
~ CIOilVoll.lDc tore. lD naamd.ftc 1a aot r.eon 
but ~ and ei~; the oontimd:t.,' ls 
pb¥a1oal, not J.oclaal. 
low Blanabard njeete t.be reaeont.nc lmpl.1oit. in tae .. quot.aUona 
on the at"Ounda tbat Blln\aprla u uplal.n\DJ tbo\llbt qy abnraotinc 
:f'l"'OI the act.1vi1if ot tboucbt and~- it aa •a tnln ot 
cbaract.erlue eventa.•S Bl.anahard'-• point here 1e that lnt..,... 
..i 
1• pomble ~it •ob pba• ot tM W..., preeeea baa epeoitS.e 
character. OrJly then ia .affl warrant provided tor one part.t.oular 
2 Saatqau, 1!11!! ot blat· P• 79. 
~., P• 10). 
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phase aucceedi.ng it rather than another. The distinction bet.wetBl 
correct and incorrect inference ia 1n terms or the "diat.1ncti ve 
essences• or ideas and not instinct and oirCU~Uta.nce. For Santayana 
thought can on:cy- obey the 11npul.aes &nd instincts or the animal 
psyche. In answer to wh;f QrVthing follows AI\Y"thinc else in reaaontlc, 
Santqana can onl,y say 1 t i.s " a perpetual genMia of the \Jhwarrant.-
able out of the contingent. wl Tbia amounts to a trank admiaeion 
that there is no explanation tor our inference pattti"ns being one 
way rather than another other than th.e habit or ·animal orpnia 
which has followed this particular bent rather than arot.her. There 
ie no good reason to believe our thoughtsbave grasped the structure 
or relations of reall ty outaide it •• 
..,, .. 
Tbla --.rr pre~ta la: topleal order the .. -.in 1Uu ot 
the thuia. 
Chapter I. 
Inherent in knQwleclce ot tact. is el"l"'l", du. to l:Mtliet and 
. . . 
1nterpretat1on.--u error ).a to be pursed am. aa indUbitable reacbad., 
bel1e1" and int.erpnt.ation mu.et be eu#pendea.-The result oE a sus-
pension ot ~ ia a aolipa1411Jl·or the pre..nt ~t.--5kept101e 
diatinguishea between taCt. and interJ)Nt.ation or ta~.~ inter-
pretation of .fact 1a auepended., the skeptic ia &xposed. to taot bit 
without lcnowl.edge about it .... -.Anavl.qe of taote, a\lOh ae abance. 
time, spac., .mlrROJ'7 and ..W.tanoe is not &1vc 1n 1ntu1tion.-
What nmaina tor tba ~ie is. the Cllat• • appiiiU"&ftCe.-The taot 
ot the dat••• appearanoe 1a ft()t pwn in the d.at-.-Bld.etanoe ol . 
the dat.UJ& can be pre8\lled. onq t'l'oa outeide the datum.-Preeenoe to 
intuition ia neither the neceaaarj l'JOr the nttiotent condition 
tor tbe exiawnce ot the 11v.n.-lothtng li'hn uiata.-'J.'M 1ntra.n-
e1t1v.,.c1ven is a ~-uiatent eeaence.-'lbe pl"'pertiea ot eaae.nee 
~~T 
are 14ent1ty, un1verpl.itq-, 1nf'1nit.y, et.rnit.y, and non-existence. 
-The pro~•• ot idctit¥ and untverality are neoeauey e»ndlt1ona 
tor tbougbt w occur. 
ChapW~- n. 
TranldU.,.. lcncnfl.ed&e 1e ..,wbolic aQd PftftPPO ... e.rdal 
., 
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occur, existence IIW!It 1~ itself to easence.--Eaaence 1a 80 
emboided in existenoe e1 ther lll'Mn an aoti ve mind uee eaaenoea 
•• tenu ot discourse or when nature 'breed& eomet.h1.llg anr.t it take8 
on an eaaenoe or forzn ...... fhe -.aobidment of essence in existence is 
named exemplification.--Essences aa p.rimordial foru ot ~are 
not rendered ambiguous }V exemplification. --The onl.7 amb1plt7 11'1 
regard to essences occurs in relati9n to the mind which ~· 
tllem. -The Ps;ycbe and. Spirit are the oomponenta of udnd.-Tbe 
Psyche, aa the seat of thought ia a complexus ot lite 8U't.a1n1.ng 
{ 
' i 
actiVities.--spirit is the oonacloue component of the mind.--Intent 
is a judgemental relation establiahecl l:v the oom.bined e1'tol"ta of 
t.he Pqche and Spirit in the courn of aeti Vi ty. -The jlxtpent ia 
that the given is lllOre than an appearance; it is a thing.--The 
habits of inference or thought are dependent on the instinct of 
the Ps,ycbe and the material c1r<rumatanees which contront 1t.-J'or 
essences to be significant terme ot thought. thfJ'1' JIWJt be interpretecl. 
--The interpretation either relates eeeenoe to essence or usence te 
Wng.-In aD3' case the relation is always est&bll.shed. batwMn the 
given and the not-given and this relation is one of intent.--Whm 
the interpretation is made in judpent, signitication occnrra.-
Signiticat1on is the meaning ot an eeaence established l::v 1nterpl"etift& 
it in relation to other eaeencea or things. 
Chapter lll. 
Pure Being ia mer~ the naae for the litc1oa1 and. aNthet.ic 
•t"Wr each easence has.--Pure Be1na doee not ca\18e -:pthe euencea 
to bei it 1• •Nl¥ a necee.r, c»nditicm tor tn• being what tatr . , 
are.-tlftlike each ue•~ which ie -.cl.Wtiv. of t.he othel" pwe Seq 
ia inQlueive 1n them all.-The identity o! an~ la tO. okraoter 
. \~,' 
it bas wbich diatinpiahee 1 t .t"l"om writy other eaaenoe. -The \11\1-
versal.ity of eaaenee 1• that feature ~cb allow• an eaiMiDoe to be 
repeated in existence w1\bout eacritieiria ita be1n&.-The int"init:.T 
or eaaence provi4ee limitl••• poS81bUltlea and 1apoae1bU1t.iee for 
t.hougnt and nature to ex-.pH t.)r. -The non....xiatenoe or u.-- di•-
t1Dguishes the q~tat1• dS.aen~ ot thiDCa which doN not reaide 
in th•.-'l'he eternity ot ea.sena. ill the condition for oba.ne• t.o 
ooour, tor w1 thout eternal ftr'•cbanc• could never ooeur .1'rcll one 
character to another. 
Chapter IV. 
SUlta;rafa • • ontolocloal. ooaol\lld.Olla an not l.ocioall7. ·~ 
on hie ekepticia.-Tbe \r'tt\h of the eonelulon •noth!.ng cive -s.eta• 
1a ....q a ~ o.r-. ~.-1 tact that U o~ ..._ ... 
. &l"ff ci..._ 1n blwt.Uon aDd they do •' u:t..t, than not.biDg giftll 
extet.e. -'lh• ~--- f4 ••aenae t.e th4l ODDUtion tor the 
eonolwd.on heine auerted ln the tiNt. plaoe .... -A ~ or the 
tenet "r»Wal ctven exiett.- 1• tt.\ exiat.noe and . ..-noe are,.46,.,. 
and exlatenoe •kea d.1rctot ~eo. of extat.te SJ~r»esible.­
Tbie ia a re.W.t or either det1niftl1nt.U1Uoa •• the enlT wiq 1D 
which experl.et\oe ot t.bins• oooure or 'tl' ~ \be t,.,.. 'exietence• 
100. 
&Del • existent t • ·-A further conaequaoe ot separat.inc ... moe ~ 
exieter\ee 1a ~t. oauaal.it.," and lntvence are rendered aea:ninc].eH.-
tlnl .. a wants have ~racter am tbia obaftot.er 1e integral to both 
caUM and etteet, there 18 no neo.saity that eftl'lta ocov one WT 
rather than another.-Iftter«lce patterna too are mean!Dgleu lalll .. a 
existent. otta.ract.er or one aort pn;vldes warrant. tor 1nt81'Tinc 
existent character ot anet.hv sort. When essence ia di'fOrced f'l"om 
exiatMlee both cauallty and ·inf'....,. ax-. grounded in aatter whiob 
1n principle 1a contl.n¥ent llJ¥1 unstable. 
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The PI"PP ... ot. tld.a theala la to ,... ...... , am nalvate Oaorce 
Sant.a;vana'a ~·of-~ 'tn. t.vo pwepMt1aa •.. one ep1ste-
~oal and the .other ontologtoal. The int.er'relation of tb3M 
two uw.a ot tbo\l&ht. ......_.. t•late V.~t .~»Mibl•· .For 
; 
tbia reaa:>n ..... 1• ~W to be at ODOe C:l) a ~ 
font ot beiftc, (2) a n._.•l7' ...U.Uon tor \t.D~t, tO eocur. and 
(3) the oonteftt ot \bovpt. 
Sant.apDa •• th.,q. ··or· lmoVledP S'Ht.a on a d1~~ot1- betweln 
tnnaitive knevl-...;.- laU&nftt.l._ tnWS:'t.t.oa. \be lt.t.t.el" ftltt 'be1nc 
Jcnowlellp at aU. Hla podtlon la that-.. Jvdpent. and belief 
are ~ in !Mld.'Wa, eo aleo 1• kaoWl.edp.· ~ de-
...v&t.ea tbla l:r ..ns.alJc a ....U..l Uep\lot• vbiOh he doea r»\ 
rut untU au i.Ml&blt.able ia .-.ohell. for t.bta akept.lo t.be el~J*"i._ 
of t.bia t.n4ubltable la ~ illtld.Ucin ot a dat• or ••--•· Tbia 
inttd.tion ot a dat• la •t kDoWl.edp l»oaue lt la 1•ed1at•• 
~and. inVaui.tlft .__. knDwltdp la Mdlat.e, tnnaitlYe 
and reteretlal. 
!be alceptio ewntval.l;r HCl\IOea eonaoioua apez1..eae t.o a 
eol1pa1• ot t.be PftMM. ~t ~ whioh all kDowledc• ot tba 
Hlt. time, chap and. 1\lbatano. ta uolwlecl. lltboup 110 knovleke 
la attained t:r. tbia aolipdatio position, the 4tMHlalt ~· NYeal. 
tbe OOD41t.lon8 neotaa:ar.r to t.rrtaob the IOUpd• and aobine lcnowledp 
ot the 11106!.. The ooDditt.one tor Wealtive knowledp an Mliet 
that tbinga not pftft in 1nt$1cm exiat and tbat the eeaencea of 
105. 
intuition eene ae a releftnt aymbol ot the thing. It lcnovledge 
ot thine• was literal and dlreot, anial faith would be \11'1fte0eU&J'7 
and the p.ven ot intuition would. be the exiet.lt. objeot. ~ 
howwer, aa taith 1n a J»aited objec\, transitiYe knowlqe S.a 
beliet 1n eubatance and the relevanee ot esaenoea aa vehiolea ot 
knowledge about subatanoe. 
Sollll8 or Santqana.. statements 1.Jr1ply that hie ra~cal akeptt-
cllllll, anpl.oJ'ecl to define tile l.bdtat.lona ot tftnaitlve knowledge, 
would, it it ra.,.S the 1ftdu'bltable expeotec:t, also haw reached a 
pr1lftord.1al rorm or being. !hie expectation ia tultUled When by 
means ot the radical skepticim, the metaplv'e1cal diot\111 •notb.1.lts 
g1 ftft existe• ie reached. The t.Nth or this aonoluld.on •nothing 
g1 nn exists• is ...-.3T a bOnaeq\\eoe or the logical tact that 1t 
only eeeenoee are giwn 1n intuition and tM.Y d.o not alat, tben 
noth1ng given exieta. The tol'Oe ot the U"'UMnt ie Yltiated, 
however, since the oonclue1on ie oontainted. in the p1"811•e ap1nat 
which no tactual evidenoe can be broucht to biG-. The plWd.•s 
~Mnt epi~logioal decisions ae to bow the t.nsa 'intuition' 
and •metenoe• are to be v.etd. rortt~MtelT, the trulttulneee ot 
the concluion •nothlng pYen aiBte• doea not depencl on the argu.. 
ment. What is made clur, hovft'er, ia that there ia no lopcal. 
conn-.ct1on of IIMch iJIIportanoe Ntween San~ • Mt.hoclol.ocioal 
skeptic1• and b1a ontological cxmclueiona. 
the truittulneaa of \he cliot\a "nothing giftft exiata• is 
aniteet«l 1n the ontological cl18tinoUon it reoop1H8 betwen 
eeMftCe ancl .nn-.oe. 1'be propert.i .. ot .. eenoe, 1dentit7. uni-
lo6.. 
'VWtNal1t.,' •. iDtinit¥, etvnlty atJ4 Mlft-aietenoe dl8tlncu1sbes 
...... u the ctualltatiTe dbeaS.on ot things. Tbla qualitatiw 
~n of t.blnge··HI'ft• 'to ..tablisb the c:baraoter or i~tit,' 
" of tbirlc• and &leo pe1'ld. te the r.pet1tion or th... ohu'aotera 1n 
thought. 
Onaeial to thie tbeeie ia the ol.-.ftp betwen the two ordere 
ot 'beinc, N.-&oe and. -s.at-.oe, •ct• neoq1U7 _. U. pt-epert.iea 
of ... _.. One ~ of thie ol.••ce is that direct ex-
perica. f4 exlet.enU 1• rMderecl blpoeeibl.e.. !be pombUi v •• 
ctvtainec:l tbat sUs~ detiftea 1nt121t1on too ~, AcoordinC 
to th1a ctetinition, intultio!l 1a the onl7 wq 1n wbiob direct or 
'•ldlate IIXpel'l_.... oOC\U'"a and t.M oontent or \ble upenenoe 1a 
• ncm-exitrtent lopoal ....... Ord.inal"y ~--· bowftr ...... 
te be of ex11Rent ~· and ~ non-ed~ J.ocioal ••---•· 
A t\l1"t.ber GOl\uqunGe of ieolaUna eaaence t1"CCII1 exlll'tence ia 
tbat both •uaU.\7 and w ... oe beooae ...ninCl•n• Uriless matter 
1• ·tadowed. 1d.th rOI'II 8UOh that~ ...-oe or a th1ftc 1• ~ 
t.o both ..... ancl etteot, there wnl4 1M • Deoeaat.v that chanp 
ooev one wq rather than anetber. S\1oh a aontinpnt theo:r:y or 
natun 1e preolaeq vbat ~ bolda. Hatter, aot esacoe ia 
the prinotple or chanp aQd vltbl.ft it there 1a no neoeasit.y vhiob 
det4ml1nea ature to take 011 one tom rather than anotbR. In 
abort• the obaraoter or one e94H1t has notblnc to do vlth the pro-
duct.1on of IDOtbw. 8,y \be .... tokerl inference patteJoou too an 
ft~Mleft4 --.nlncl•ea \1ftl.eaa exlat.nt. obaraetw or one aon prroYidu 
lO?. 
w.rzoa.an tor 1nt81'Tin& existent character ot another eort. Santa• 
7an& acoovnts for tbeee IIIOVeaaent$ in thought 1n tenns of matter, 
tbat 1s, the impulaea of a mat..r1al p.che. Once necessity is 
abandoned for 1lnpul.ae and intrtinot.,. our JU«ms o! unde.tandinc the 
real world ia reduced to the n<m.-rational and at beet 1a zoelevant 
11\Yth· 
